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A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions
Gary E. Sullivan*
Bankruptcy has broadly failed to deliver “fresh starts” to debtors.
Too often, debtors return to states of financial distress following bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy delivers a clean slate through the discharge
of debts, the efficacy of a fresh start depends on a second factor: property
exemptions. While discharge frees a debtor from her existing debts,
property exemptions determine what property the debtor retains upon
exiting bankruptcy. For many debtors, insufficient and suboptimal property exemption laws undermine fresh starts. In fact, under current bankruptcy law, each state can reject federal bankruptcy exemptions by
opting out. Bankrupt debtors in “opt-out” states are forced to rely on
general state exemptions—often stingy and focused on preserving homesteads—that were not designed for bankruptcy.
Existing literature explores two lines of criticism against the federal
opt-out provision: (1) arguing that the law should be struck down as
repugnant to constitutional notions of uniformity, supremacy, or both,
and (2) making the case for repeal on normative and fairness grounds.
For decades, neither solution has been forthcoming. The opt-out scheme,
at first aberrant and controversial, has proved a perdurable feature of
bankruptcy law.
This Article advances a different approach and proposes diffusive,
state-based reform solutions. Under this approach, each opt-out state
would undertake a meaningful review of its existing exemptions regime
in light of the federally declared rehabilitative function of bankruptcy. I
propose a model, to be used in this review, involving three factors—
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housing agnosticism, nominal sufficiency, and allocative flexibility—as a
conceptual framework for reforms. Addressing constitutional concerns,
this Article argues that these innovative “bankruptcy-specific exemptions” schemes should survive constitutional scrutiny. The Article ends
with discussion of the model and proposed reform framework.
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INTRODUCTION
Exemptions play a prominent role in bankruptcy1 by determining what property a debtor can keep. Traditionally creatures
of state law, exemptions prevent unsecured creditors from seizing
or forcing the sale of a debtor’s property. In bankruptcy,
exemptions operate in the same way by determining the types and
amounts of property that can or cannot be sold by the trustee. In
typical Chapter 7 cases, the trustee liquidates a debtor’s interest in
unencumbered non-exempt assets.2 What is left over, the debtor retains.
Property exemptions implicate a strong federal interest when
a debtor files bankruptcy. That interest is the “fresh start.” The
“fresh start” concept, now deeply entrenched in the bankruptcy
psyche, was first discussed by the United States Supreme Court in
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, where the Court emphasized the rehabilitative function of bankruptcy.3 Central to a “fresh start” is the
discharge in bankruptcy, which frees a debtor’s future income

1. This Article explores exemption policies in the context of an individual filing
liquidation bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
2. Because exemptions cannot generally impair properly perfected security
interests, only a debtor’s equity in assets is protected by an exemption. Stated another way,
exemptions protect assets from seizure by unsecured creditors. A simple example is
illustrative. Assume there are two debtors living in a jurisdiction providing a $5,000
exemption for a motor vehicle. Each debtor owns a motor vehicle worth $7,500. Both
debtors owe $10,000 in unsecured debt to Credit Card Corporation. Debtor A has no
secured debt, while Debtor B has a single secured loan in the amount of $4,000 secured by a
perfected security interest in his motor vehicle. Because exemptions protect a debtor’s
equity, Credit Card Corporation (or, in bankruptcy, the Trustee as proxy for the unsecured
creditors) can use the legal process to seize Debtor A’s car (equity of $7,500 exceed
exemption of $5,000) while it cannot seize Debtor B’s car (equity of $7,500 minus $4,000
equals $3,000, which is fully protected by the $5,000 exemption).
3. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the
honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns
at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”).
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from existing creditor claims. As noted by Professor Thomas
Jackson, a discharge preserves a debtor’s “human capital.”4
While discharge frees a debtor’s future income from existing
creditor claims, the discharge alone does not define the “fresh
start.” A related, and often coequal, component of the “fresh start”
is property exemptions. What property should a debtor be entitled
to keep to begin his post-bankruptcy trek toward rehabilitation?
The answer to this question can determine the efficacy of the
“fresh start.” A debtor freed from creditor claims but left in an
abject state of balance sheet poverty faces higher hurdles to
rehabilitation than a debtor left with substantial property. This
difference is particularly acute when the types of property held by
the latter debtor enable him to seek and sustain employment.
Simply put, a discharged debtor with a car, computer, and applicable “tools of the trade” is in a superior position to mount a
“comeback” than a similarly situated discharged debtor retaining
little to no property. While discharge enables a fresh start, exemptions determine the location of the starting line in the debtor’s race
toward rehabilitation following bankruptcy.
Congress weighed in on where the starting line should be in
1978. Following nearly a century of silence on the question of
what specific exemptions should apply in bankruptcy,5 Congress
passed a detailed set of federal bankruptcy exemptions in § 522(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code. These federal exemptions were more
generous to debtors than most state exemptions, and they
included a so-called “wild card” exemption mechanism making
them even more favorable to debtors.6 Categories of property
4. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1393, 1396 (1985). “Our bankruptcy statutes have always taken ‘discharge’ to mean,
essentially, that an individual’s human capital (as manifested in future earnings), as well as
his future inheritances and gifts, are freed of liabilities he incurred in the past.” Id.
5. Under the bankruptcy law passed in the form of the 1898 Act, in effect from 1898
until 1978, Congress completely delegated exemptions policy to the states by simply
incorporating state exemptions into bankruptcy. See infra Section I.C.2.
6. In order to provide a debtor with a certain amount of flexibility with respect to
claiming exemptions, the Bankruptcy Code contains a “wild card” exemption codified at
§ 522(d)(5). 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2012). This exemption is commonly referred to as a “wild
card” exemption because it enables a debtor to essentially select any type of property to
exempt up to $11,500, provided that the debtor has not used all of the homestead
exemption contained in § 522(d)(1). Id. § 522(d)(1). See James C. Mordy, Brian H. Dunn &
Melanie Mann Johnson, Constitutionality of “Opt-Out” Statutes Providing for Exemptions to
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were included to protect certain dollar amounts in a debtor’s
homestead, motor vehicles, household goods and furnishings,
jewelry, and the like.7
After clearly articulating its vision of the appropriate exemptions level in bankruptcy, Congress undermined it by allowing
states the right to “opt out” of the federal exemptions.8 The line
was drawn, but Congress provided states with erasers. Predictably, this odd “line plus erasers” structure was the result of a
political compromise between the House and Senate.9 Since passage of the Code, exemptions are now determined under this
concurrent system—federal exemptions apply in bankruptcy,
unless the debtor’s state has opted out, in which case exemptions
are determined by state law.10 Over two-thirds of states opted out
of federal bankruptcy exemptions, leaving Congress’s determination of appropriate exemptions available to residents of only
thirteen states.
Following enactment of the Code, scholars and commentators
leveled searing criticisms of the concurrent exemptions system in
bankruptcy. Some attacked the constitutionality of the “opt out”
provisions on the bases of the Bankruptcy Clause’s call for
“uniform Laws,” the Supremacy Clause, or both. Prominent in
these criticisms was the argument that debtors in “opt out” states
Bankrupts, 48 MO. L. REV. 627, 630 (1983). The wild card exemption is applicable to any
property the debtor has, and effectively allows the debtor to use any “unused” portion of
the § 522(d)(1) homestead exemption. For example, if a debtor is unable to claim a
homestead exemption under § 522(d)(1) because the debtor does not currently own a home,
the debtor may apply the unused portion of that exemption to any property the debtor
wishes to exempt. See WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III & NANCY FRAAS
MACLEAN, BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION MANUAL § 5:6 (2012 ed.). “By utilizing the wild card
provision, the non-homeowner, or the homeowner with minimal equity in his property,
can avail himself of the homestead exemption by exempting valuable property to the extent
of the unused portion of that exemption.” Mordy, supra, at 630. Essentially, the unused
homestead exemption “spills over” to other property in order to make up for the debtor’s
lack of ability to take advantage of the homestead exemption. Section 522(d)(5) may be
applied to any property of the debtor and there is no limitation with regard to the type of
property that may be exempt using this wild card exemption. Id. The main purpose of this
wild card exemption, according to Congress, is to eliminate the prior discrimination against
non-homeowner debtors. Id.
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
8. See id. § 522(b)(2).
9. See infra Section I.C.2.
10. Most non-opt out states retained their own exemption schemes, permitting a
debtor filing bankruptcy to choose federal exemptions or state general exemptions.

339

02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/7/18 10:02 AM

2018

were being deprived of the same “fresh start” afforded to debtors
in states permitting federal exemptions. In terms of solutions to
this problem, two primary arguments were advanced: (i) advocating that the Court determine the opt-out provision unconstitutional (thereby rendering the federal exemptions available in
every bankruptcy case) or (ii) calling on Congress to amend § 522
by removing the opt-out and imposing uniform federal exemptions on all states.
For over three decades since passage of the Code, neither
solution has been forthcoming. The Court has shown no appetite
for taking up arguments in favor of striking down the opt-out
provision, and Congress has made no serious attempt to amend
§ 522 by making federal exemptions mandatorily available
in bankruptcy.
This Article proposes a third solution: widespread state
enactment and liberalization of exemptions specifically designed
for debtors in bankruptcy. Using so-called bankruptcy-specific
exemptions, states should provide tailored exemptions to flush
the starting lines for debtor rehabilitation. This Article argues that
each opt-out state should move toward providing a comprehensive set of exemptions for bankrupt debtors. The argument
entails two fundamental points: (i) explaining how and why state
bankruptcy-specific exemption schemes are constitutional under
the Bankruptcy Clause and Supremacy Clause and (ii) proposing
a conceptual model for state legislatures to follow in crafting
reforms. The model includes three factors: eliminating or minimizing discrimination against non-homeowners, providing nominally sufficient dollar amounts, and reducing the rigidity of
property classifications to permit debtors to protect more types
of property.
I. EXEMPTIONS AND BANKRUPTCY
My basic thesis: General state exemption schemes largely fail
to serve the rehabilitative function11 of federal bankruptcy law
11. Ideally, an empirical study would be necessary to prove an actual causal
relationship between the federal exemptions providing a more efficacious fresh start base
than competing state exemptions providing less dollar amounts and less flexible categories.
None has been published. To fill this gap, this Article relies on the premise that an
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because they were designed for other purposes. This divergence
in purposes is illustrated by examining the justifications for
general state exemptions versus federal bankruptcy exemptions.
Further support for this thesis is found in using the Contracts
Clause as a lens through which to review the reasons states have
general exemptions laws and the constitutional limits on states’
power to achieve debtor rehabilitation.
A. Divergent Purposes
A common critique of the existing concurrent exemptions
scheme is that many state exemptions are “less generous”12 than
the federal bankruptcy exemptions. Under general federalism
principles, states can define property rights, including the
contours of exemptions, as they see fit. Many states prefer
generous homestead exemptions while others focus on protecting
other asset classes such as retirement accounts, tax refunds, and
the like.
When a resident of a state files bankruptcy, however, an
important federal interest is triggered. The rehabilitative function
of bankruptcy, ensconced in the “fresh start,” arises. States
choosing to veto federal exemptions leave bankrupt residents with
existing bankruptcy-neutral state exemptions. Can these bankruptcy-neutral exemptions play an appropriate role in delivering a
fresh start? Do they?
The divergent purposes of bankruptcy versus bankruptcyneutral exemptions provide powerful clues to the answer.
exemption scheme that permits a debtor to retain higher dollar amounts of more congruent
types of property provides a stronger fresh start foundation than one that does not. By way
of example, for two similarly situated debtors who have unencumbered interests in a motor
vehicle and tools of the trade, an exemption scheme providing protection of these interests
puts the debtor in a superior position for future rehabilitation than the competing scheme
that permits the bankruptcy trustee to repossess and sell these items.
12. This phrase, used in much of the literature, is oversimplified. Assume an
exemption regime that allows a debtor to keep an aggregate amount of $35,000 among
items of personal property such as household goods, motor vehicles, computer equipment,
tools of the trade, etc. Compare that regime to a competing regime that provides zero
exemptions for personal property but a homestead exemption of $40,000. The oft-used
“generous” measure would label the former scheme as “less generous.” Perhaps it is. But
with respect to the fresh start, the former is arguably more generous, as it protects types of
assets which, retained, could enable a debtor to seek or advance employment in an effort
to rehabilitate.
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State exemptions are not constructed to enable a debtor’s
rehabilitation. Rather, state exemptions serve other purposes.
Chief among these purposes: (i) preventing debtors from becoming
wards of the state, (ii) providing a guarantee of some minimal level
of subsistence, and (iii) serving the societal function of preserving
families. These justifications and purposes, explored below, are
collectively referred to as the “Independent Subsistence Function”
of state property exemptions.
Preventing debtor dependence on state benefits is an
important prong of the Independent Subsistence Function.
Legislatures answer the question of whether losses from debtors
unable to pay their bills should be allocated to unsecured creditors
(prevented from seizing and selling exempt property) or to the
state in the form of transfer payments and social welfare benefits.
Maintaining some level of property exempt from creditor seizure
favors the state by decreasing the number of debtors becoming
public charges.13
In adopting exemptions, states typically seek to establish a
subsistence “floor” for debtors. In Georgia, for instance, the
“purpose and reason for the enactment of the exemption statutes
was to allow the family of the debtor to retain at least some
items . . . in order that the family might have the barest essentials
for human existence.”14 Among state exemptions, homestead
provisions are often connected to preservation of the family
structure. In enacting homestead exemptions, state legislatures
rely on public policy considerations, including maintaining the
stability of families. The “preservation of the home is of paramount importance because there the family may be sheltered
and preserved.”15
In sharp contrast, the paramount justification for federal bankruptcy exemptions is the debtor’s interest in retaining property to

13. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Pegasus Ranch, Inc., 920 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (citing Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954) (en banc)).
14. Rietz v. Butler, 322 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
15. In re Rutland, 318 B.R. 588, 590 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004) (quoting First Ala. Bank
v. Renfro, 452 So. 2d 464, 468 (Ala. 1984)). In Iowa, the homestead benefit seeks to secure
the “social benefit which accrues to the state by having families secure in their homes.” In
re McClain’s Estate, 262 N.W. 666, 669 (Iowa 1935).
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enable a meaningful opportunity at a “fresh start.”16 This
justification is the “Fresh Start Function.”17 Much of this justification has resulted from the evolution and maturation of
bankruptcy law from a strictly creditor-centered liquidation
procedure to a mechanism for individuals to seek relief and
restoration. Concerns about providing debtors a path to “fresh
starts” were of paramount importance in the debate leading to the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, now referred to
as the Bankruptcy Code. The focus on “fresh starts” enjoyed a
conspicuous start of its own.
Specifically, in 1970, Congress created the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws (the Commission) to “study, analyze, evaluate,
and recommend” changes to the bankruptcy laws.18 “The
Commission’s study, analysis, and evaluation shall include a
consideration of the basic philosophy of bankruptcy . . . and all
other matters which the Commission shall deem relevant.”19
Between the findings and recommendations of the Commission,
and the legislative process that ensued, one consensus was clear:
exemptions in bankruptcy were viewed as integral to the
“fresh start.”
In 1973, the Commission issued its report to Congress and
recommended a revised Bankruptcy Act.20 In that report, the
Commission identified two equally important functions of bankruptcy law: (i) to continue the orderly credit economy in the event
of a debtor’s inability or unwillingness to pay his debts and
(ii) rehabilitate debtors for “continued and more value-production

16. While the legislative record preceding enactment of the federal exemptions
contains references to concerns that debtors in bankruptcy avoid complete destitution, the
fresh start was the defining policy justifying federal exemptions in bankruptcy. See infra
notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
17. To be sure, the legislative record in the debate about bankruptcy exemptions
contains references to some congressional concerns about debtors avoiding destitution. In
this sense, the Independent Subsistence Function and Fresh Start Function are not
completely mutually exclusive. The concern about debtor rehabilitation is, however, a
peculiarly federal policy.
18. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong. (1970).
19. Id.
20. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pts. I, II, and III (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
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participation, i.e., to provide a meaningful ‘fresh start.’”21
Tellingly, the report observed that:
The primary function of the bankruptcy system is to continue the law-based orderliness of the open credit economy in
the event of a debtor’s inability or unwillingness generally to
pay his debts. . . . The second function of the bankruptcy process,
on a par with the first, is to rehabilitate debtors for continued
and more value-productive participation, i.e., to provide a meaningful “fresh start.”22

The Commission recommended “exclusive federal exemptions”
because such uniformity would avoid “the unfairness of existing
state exemption laws, most of which are archaic, some of which . . .
are exceedingly niggardly, particularly as to urban residents.”23
In many instances, the Commission drew explicit links
between exemptions in bankruptcy and the “fresh start.” Congress took note, and the legislative hearings surrounding the
exemptions debate reflected a strong concern for the effect on
“fresh starts.”24 The House version incorporated the recommendations of the Commission and included federal uniform bankruptcy exemptions. The House bill did not permit states to veto
the federal exemptions.
Proponents of the competing Senate bill argued, however, that
states should continue to control exemptions. The Senate bill
backers saw the House bill and the attendant federal exemptions
as bestowing “instant affluence” on bankruptcy debtors. The
Senate bill carried forward the Bankruptcy Act provision
deferring to “non-bankruptcy law” as the source of exemptions.
The resulting compromise, later codified in § 522, provided
uniform federal exemptions along with an “opt out” feature for
states, a political settlement described as a “strange compromise . . .
[leading] to a bizarre result.”25

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 171.
For a more thorough review of the Commission and related legislative history,
see infra Section I.C.2.
25. Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-forLawyers Bill, Part II: Consumer Bankruptcy, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 175, 183 (1979).
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Some defenders of the opt-out provision assumed that as part
of deliberating and arriving at the decision to opt out, states would
be occasioned to “reexamine” their own exemption schemes. While
it is unclear how many states undertook a reexamination, virtually
no opt-out state undertook meaningful efforts at exemption reform
as part of enacting opt-out legislation. As a result, exemptions
justified by and seeking to serve the Independent Subsistence
Function, rather than the Fresh Start Function, remain the only
exemptions available to bankrupt debtors in many opt-out states.
B. States Without Power to Grant Fresh Starts
It is not surprising that state exemptions were not designed to
advance the Fresh Start Function. In fact, states lack a fundamental constitutional power that would permit an exemption to
serve this function: because states cannot impair contractual rights
of creditors, states do not have the power to grant a discharge.
Only the federal government has such power.
The Contracts Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . . pass
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”26 Chief
Justice Marshall succinctly summarized the general purpose of the
Contracts Clause:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and
creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes
home to every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the
conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes
to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been used
to such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the
ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence
between man and man. This mischief had become so great, so
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and
threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the
people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard
against the continuance of the evil was an object of deep interest
with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of this great

26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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community, and was one of the important benefits expected
from a reform of the government.27

While the prohibition against states impairing contracts is not
absolute,28 the Court has used the Clause to strike down state
statutes on this basis.29 Furthermore, it is clear that “a relatively
strict standard of [Contracts Clause] review [extends] to legislative
interference with private as well as public contracts.”30 State laws
that render contracts “invalid, or releases or extinguishes them[,]”
may impair obligations in the constitutionally proscribed sense.31
Accordingly, any state law granting a debtor discharge from his
creditor obligations could be challenged on the basis of a
Contracts Clause violation.
As a consequence, states cannot grant debtors an essential
ingredient of a fresh start—the discharge. This limitation further
illustrates why general state exemptions are not designed to serve
the Fresh Start Function. State exemptions do not—indeed, absent
bankruptcy, cannot—provide debtors with the clean slate needed
to pursue financial rehabilitation. Though exemptions can grant
enhanced property rights, states cannot relieve debtors of their
obligations to pay existing debts. 32

27. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (quoting Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354–55 (1827)).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414 (1984).
30. Id. at 1417.
31. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 431. Some scholars have discussed the Contracts Clause as
prohibiting any law that permitted states themselves to escape paying creditors. For instance,
in a recent article exploring the idea of allowing states to file bankruptcy, Professor Skeel
noted that “[s]tate bankruptcy might … encounter turbulence under the Contracts Clause,
because it would alter existing contracts, which the states themselves ordinarily cannot
do.” David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 707 (2012).
32. With rare exceptions, exemptions protect against claims by unsecured creditors,
as most exemptions schemes do not allow impairment of a properly perfected lien held by
a secured creditor. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) reflects the long-standing state law
principle that a security interest may not be impaired by a property exemption. One
notable exception allows a debtor in bankruptcy to avoid non-possessory, non-PMSI liens
that impair her exemptions in certain types of property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2012). Viewed
broadly, when § 522(f) was enacted as part of the 1978 Code, it attempted to shift leverage
away from certain secured creditors and toward debtors. This section has been a source of
discontent among some academics and practitioners. While Congress amended the
language of § 522(f) in 1994 to address some of the textual and functional concerns raised
by courts and commentators, critics remained. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing
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C. Exemptions in Bankruptcy
The subject of exemptions has been addressed in each of the
five bankruptcy acts Congress enacted from 1800 to 1978. The
constitutional requirement of “uniform Laws” provides a textual
signal that exemptions in bankruptcy should enjoy some dimension of uniformity. Early on, it was so. Over the span of the
nineteenth century and four bankruptcy acts, the treatment of
exemptions in bankruptcy morphed from basic uniform federal
exemptions to a hybrid of federal and state exemptions, settling
with the Bankruptcy Act in 1898 providing an exemption scheme
with no federal exemptions that granted complete deference to
exemption laws of the various states. This “state law only”
exemption structure survived from 1898 until the 1978 Act. In
1978, Congress enacted the first set of detailed (and uniform)
federal bankruptcy exemptions. Each state was, however, empowered to opt out of the federal exemptions. Over two-thirds of the
states exercised this power.
1. Historical synopsis of exemptions in bankruptcy: The first four acts,
1800 to 1898
The first three bankruptcy acts were in response to national
financial crises, and each was repealed within a few years of
passage. Following ratification of the Constitution, the first
century of the United States was marked by the general absence,
interrupted by brief exceptions, of any national bankruptcy law.
Indeed, until 1898, when Congress passed the first “permanent”
bankruptcy law, no national bankruptcy law existed in 93 of the
first 109 years following ratification.
The original congressional expression of bankruptcy law
resulted in enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. Unsurprisingly, this Act was modeled on British bankruptcy law. The 1800
Act provided federal exemptions that were both limited and
uniform.33 The 1800 Act was repealed after three years34 and was

Liens Under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f): One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 34–37 (1999).
33. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat.
248. Exemptions were limited to necessities such as wearing apparel and bedding. Id. at 23.
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followed next by the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.35 The 1841 Act
echoed the uniform federal exemptions of the 1800 Act by prescribing bankruptcy exemptions for necessities such as wearing
apparel and household furniture not exceeding an aggregate
value of $300.00.36 Neither act permitted state law exemptions
in bankruptcy.37
State exemptions made an entrance into bankruptcy exemption law with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which
for the first time referred to the exemption laws of states. The 1867
Act introduced a hybrid system of exemptions, providing a
uniform set of federal exemptions that were supplemented by the
exemption laws of the states. For the first time in American
history, state exemption laws played a prominent role in
determining the size of the bankruptcy estate available for
distribution to creditors. The final nineteenth-century iteration of
bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, in which
Congress completely removed federal exemptions. The 1898 Act
required that property exempt in bankruptcy be determined
solely by reference to laws of the state of domicile of the debtor.
This state-law-only structure for bankruptcy exemptions would
continue until the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.
2. The (optional) federal exemptions of the 1978 Code
In 1978, the Bankruptcy Code was enacted and included the
concurrent federal-exemptions-plus-opt-out structure. This exemption system, never fully debated or vetted, resulted from a
last-minute compromise between the House and Senate. The
former required uniform federal exemptions as a floor to which
states could add, while the latter continued the 1898 Act’s
deference to states to determine all exemptions in bankruptcy.
Congress essentially ignored the unanimous recommendation
of the Commission for mandatory uniform federal exemptions. The

34. Id. at 19.
35. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5

Stat. 614.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160,

185–87 (1991).
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Commission had recommended that the new federal exemptions
displace state exemptions, rendering the latter irrelevant in
bankruptcy. Although appealing in some ways, the idea of having
an exclusive and uniform set of federal exemptions in bankruptcy
poses its own significant challenges and limitations.38
a. The commission report and political compromise. An in-depth
review of the Commission report (the Report) and legislative
history behind the concurrent exemptions scheme provides context and a base from which the role of exemptions as integral to
the “fresh start” is confirmed.
The review begins in 1970. In that year, Congress created a
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws to study, analyze, and recommend changes in bankruptcy law.39 The Commission identified
two equally important functions of bankruptcy law:
The primary function of the bankruptcy system is to continue the law-based orderliness of the open credit economy in the

38. Following years of scholarly criticism of the concurrent exemptions scheme of
the Code, a second movement began to call for Congress to move to exclusive uniform
federal exemptions in bankruptcy. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS],
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html. As with the recommendations from
the 1970s commission, Congress did not act on the 1997 call for exemptions uniformity and
exclusivity at the federal level. One of the basic arguments against forcing uniform federal
exemptions on bankrupts relates to the differences in cost of living between the states. If
Congress determined that a homestead exemption for a bankrupt is $15,000, is this
generous enough in a high cost of living state like Rhode Island or New York? Is $15,000
too generous in a low cost of living state like Oklahoma or Mississippi? Such a uniform rule
would be facially “uniform” but practically disuniform in application and outcomes,
depending on where a debtor resides. Other costs of imposing a uniform federal set of
exemptions are equally concerning, though perhaps less obvious to the casual observer. As
explained by Professor Marcus Cole:
The central point of recognizing the federalist character of bankruptcy law is
to highlight the potential value of disparate substantive regimes across states,
and the costs incurred by individuals and society when these differences are
erased. If the purpose of federalist structures is to provide for a range of free
choice among competing regimes for the benefit of individuals, harmonization
imposes a cost upon individuals and, in the aggregate, on social welfare. This
cost, referred to [] as the ‘federalist cost’ of harmonizing substantive law, is small
when jurisdictions arrive at agreement as to substantive legal rules. The
federalist cost is large, however, where the states vary dramatically, as in the case
of property exemption law.
G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Costs of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227,
230 (2000).
39. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
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event of a debtor’s inability or unwillingness generally to pay his
debts. . . . The second function of the bankruptcy process, on a
par with the first, is to rehabilitate debtors for continued and
more value-productive participation, i.e., to provide a meaningful “fresh start.”40

The Commission found that the exemption provision of the
state-exemptions-only feature of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
was ineffective.41
The Commission ultimately recommended exclusive federal
exemptions beginning with a nucleus of “kinds of property that
traditionally have been treated as exempt by state governments”
with “appropriate federal maximums.”42 According to the Commission, uniformity would prevent the unfairness of the existing
state exemption laws.43
Public debate regarding the Commission’s proposal brought
comments from the National Bankruptcy Conference and the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.44 Both organizations
approved of federal uniformity in the exemption area but took the
position that “the federal law should only establish a floor,
‘leaving the states free to prescribe more generous exemptions for
their domiciliaries if they see fit to do so.’”45 The proposal by the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges provided uniform
federal exemptions as a floor with state exemptions available as an
alternative.46 However, the Commission rejected this idea, finding that the differences between generous exemptions states and
others were too pronounced and could lead to imbalances
among debtors. 47
The Commission’s proposal was introduced in Congress in
1973 and 1974. The subcommittees of the House and Senate
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 71 (alteration in original).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
J. Ronald Trost & Lawrence P. King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977,
33 BUS. LAW. 489, 524 (1978) (quoting Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R.
32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. app., § 4-503, at 356 (1975–76)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act Revision].
46. Id.
47. Id. at 170 (statement of Professor Frank R. Kennedy).
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Judiciary Committees held hearings, and witnesses appeared in
support of both proposals. At the hearings, a representative of the
American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association stated the following:
I do not think that you are going to be able to get total
uniformity [in exemptions], because I do not believe that States
[with exemptions higher than those proposed] are going to be
receptive to the reduction in that they feel that it will not afford
the proper protection for the consumers or [sic] their States; and
conversely I do not feel that some States with lower minimums
are going to feel at all comfortable with the positions taken by
the higher exemption status.48

Other witnesses agreed. “I know there is going to be a lot of
opposition in States like Texas and California, where the exemptions are generous . . . .”49
The House and Senate completed their hearings, and the
House Subcommittee drafted a new bill, introduced in the House
in 1977 as H.R. 6.50 Until this bill, most of the opposition to the
federal exemptions had focused on the drawbacks of placing a
ceiling on state exemptions. H.R. 6 set a federal floor for exemptions but permitted states to set higher exemptions. One
Congressman noted, when introducing H.R. 6, that “federal
exemptions were necessary because ‘many states have not
rewritten their exemption laws since the 19th Century, most are
outmoded and hopelessly inadequate.’”51 H.R. 6 was replaced by
H.R. 8200, which contained essentially the same exemptions. H.R.
8200 set a federal floor for exemptions but permitted debtors to
choose those exemptions provided by state and federal nonbankruptcy law as an alternative. The House Report on H.R. 8200
stated the following:

48. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 135–36 (1975)
(statement of Walter W. Vaughan).
49. Bankruptcy Act Revision, supra note 45, at 358 (statement of Vern Countryman)
50. H.R. 6, 95th Cong. (1977), introduced on January 4, 1977, 123 CONG. REC.
125 (1977).
51. 123 CONG. REC. H21 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Don Edwards).
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Under current law, what property is exempt is determined
under State law. However, some State exemption laws have not
been revised in this century. Most are outmoded, designed for
more rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to serve the needs
of and provide a fresh start for modern urban debtors. The
historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a
debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic
necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his
nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a
public charge. The purpose has not changed, but neither have
the level of exemptions in many States. Thus, the purpose has
largely been defeated.
Though exemption laws have been considered within the
province of State law under the current Bankruptcy Act, H.R.
8200 adopts the position that there is a Federal interest in seeing
that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out with
adequate possessions to begin his fresh start. Recognizing,
however, the circumstances do vary in different parts of the
country, the bill permits the States to set exemption levels
appropriate to the locale, and allows debtors to choose between
the State exemptions and the Federal exemptions provided in the
bill. Thus, the bill continues to recognize the States’ interest in
regulating credit within the States, but enunciates a bankruptcy
policy favoring a fresh start.52

The Report further noted that an individual debtor may choose
between exemption systems. The debtor may choose the federal
exemptions or the exemptions that he is entitled to under other
federal law or the law of the state of his domicile.53 H.R. 8200 did
not permit states to preempt or veto the federal exemptions.
The Senate introduced a competing bill, S. 2266. This bill
provided that exemptions would be governed solely by nonbankruptcy law and thus omitted the House’s proposed bill that
included a federal exemptions floor. The National Bankruptcy
Conference warned the Subcommittee that “S. 2266 would delete
or seriously impair most of the provisions in H.E. [sic] 8200 that

52. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 126 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6087
(footnote call number omitted).
53. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6316.
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make the debtor’s fresh start, a basic bankruptcy concept,
more meaningful.”54
[One] aspect of a meaningful fresh start is exemptions.
Presently, the Bankruptcy Act provides an ineffective System by
incorporating the exemption laws of the various states. Many
States provide little exemption benefits to a debtor. The House
Bill also permits the use of State law, but contains a Federal
alternative which assures at least uniform minimum benefits.
The Senate Bill returns us to the present system which has
proven unsatisfactory, as indicated in the previous hearings before the Senate and House Subcommittees and the Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.55

However, proponents of the Senate Bill continued to argue
that states should control exemptions.56 The Senate Judiciary
Committee stated in the report on S. 2266 the following: “The
committee feels that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to provide
a fresh start, but not instant affluence, as would be possible under
the provisions of H.R. 8200.”57
As enacted, § 522(b) was a compromise between the House
and Senate proposals. Each state was allowed, ultimately, the
power to “opt out” of the federal exemptions.58 This scheme
resulted from a fluky political compromise, under which Congress
adopted a concurrent system.59

54. Id.
55. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the

Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.
835 (1977).
56. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 6 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5792.
57. Id. (“H.R. 8200 would establish 11 categories of property for the Federal
exemption, among which is a homestead exemption of $10,000. Such a provision in joint
cases would result in a husband choosing State exemptions while a wife might choose
Federal exemptions. Together, they could thus retain after bankruptcy, very substantial
amounts of property while their debts would have been discharged.”).
58. Technically, the federal exemptions are “bankruptcy specific exemptions,” as
they are only available in bankruptcy. In this article, “bankruptcy specific exemptions”
refer to state law exemptions that apply only in bankruptcy. See infra Section III.B.
59. The legislative process resulting in the enactment of § 522 has, itself, attracted
critics. For scholars viewing uniformity as a positive restriction on congressional power,
deferring exemptions to the states is antithetical to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause.
For instance, one scholar provided this critical characterization of the legislative process:
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b. The 1994 reform effort. Nearly two decades after the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed, Congress faced
another movement to enact further reforms and refinements to the
Bankruptcy Code. The resulting legislation was the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994.
Although none of the 1994 reforms affected the concurrent
exemptions scheme of § 522, the legislative process provided an
opportunity to revisit the subject of bankruptcy exemptions. The
National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the 1994 Commission)
was an independent commission established pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.60 The purpose of the Commission
included a broad charge to “investigate and study issues relating
to the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”61
The 1994 Commission issued its final report, entitled
Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years62 (the 1994 Report), and included

The legislative history of section 522 reveals an overly deferential attitude to
state power and a confused notion of uniformity that beclouded the deliberations
of legislators.
....
The opt-out proviso was part of neither the Senate nor House bill but
appeared as an excrescence of the final draft of section 522. This draft resulted
from a frenzied attempt by an informal conference committee to iron out the
differences between the two bills. The conference committee apparently did not
consider the constitutionality of the opt-out provision. Concerning the states’
authority to reject federal exemptions, Senator DeConcini remarked that ‘it was
agreed that a Federal exemption standard will be codified but that the States
could at any time reject them in which case the State exemption laws would
continue to prevail.’
....
History leaves little doubt that the parochial interests enshrined in state
exemption laws were among the precise evils impending national commerce and
credit addressed by the Framers and are better viewed as the intended victims of
an exercise of the bankruptcy power than as its beneficiaries.
Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemptions Laws: A Reexamination of the
Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 92–96 (1983) (emphasis omitted).
While the opt-out has been challenged on constitutional grounds, the courts have declined
to disturb the opt-out provision. See In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied
Sullivan v. United States, 459 U.S. 992 (1982) (opt-out provisions of § 522 are constitutional
under the Bankruptcy and Supremacy Clauses). But see Tracey Nicolau Bosomworth,
Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions of Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge, 58
IND. L.J. 143 (1982).
60. NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, NBRC Fact Sheet, GOVINFO (Aug. 12, 1997), http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/facts.html.
61. Id.
62. BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, supra note 38, at Table of Contents.

354

02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

335

9/7/18 10:02 AM

A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions

several reports prepared by various professors and government
agencies.63 One of the reports prepared and attached in the
appendix of the 1994 Report was written by Judge William H.
Brown and Professor Lawrence Ponoroff. That report, entitled
Analysis of Bankruptcy Exemption Policy, argued in favor of a
national, mandatory federal property exemption scheme, which
would “[recognize] that the fresh start in bankruptcy is a matter of
federal, not state, concern.”64
One of the chapters of the 1994 Report, entitled Property
Exemptions, revisited and discussed the purpose of allowing
certain property to be exempted in bankruptcy.65 Among other
things, the report discussed some of the policy reasons supporting
exemptions, noting that debtors cannot go to work without
clothes nor can they perform their jobs without “tools of their
trades.”66 The exemptions provided by the Bankruptcy Code
“preserve citizens’ ability and incentive to earn and pay taxes.”67
This ensures that citizens are able to be productive members
of society.68
The 1994 Report traced the history of exemptions in
bankruptcy and noted that the role of exemptions had evolved as
bankruptcy law had matured.
As the Bankruptcy Act [of 1898] weathered the evolution of
debtor-creditor relations throughout the Twentieth Century, the
goals of the consumer bankruptcy system matured and diverged more
sharply from those of state law creditor collection statutes. Although
exemptions should not be unnecessarily generous, grossly insufficient
state exemptions were inconsistent with rehabilitating failing families
and encouraging work and self-sufficiency.69

63. See id.
64. WILLIAM H. BROWN & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, Analysis of Bankruptcy Exemption

Policy, in BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, supra note 38, at app. G(1)(b), http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/g1b.pdf.
65. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, Property Exemptions, in BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS, supra note 38, at 117, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/05ccons.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).

355

02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/7/18 10:02 AM

2018

The 1994 Report was one of the first sources to note that
bankruptcy served different purposes than state collection laws.
This acknowledgement reflected the modern role of bankruptcy
law in facilitating debtor rehabilitation and the important role
exemptions play in furtherance of that goal.
II. LANDSCAPE OF EXEMPTIONS IN STATES
The extent to which exemption dollar amounts of categories
still differ among states remains striking. In opt-out states, these
state exemptions define what exemptions are available to bankrupt debtors.
Variations among state exemption schemes have a strong
historical foundation and reflect, in some cases, “holdovers” from
the nineteenth century when many of these schemes were enacted.
Efforts to nationalize state general exemption standards have fallen
flat. Very flat.70
The two common variables among state exemptions are the
categories and dollar amounts of property protected. In general,
the types of property protected by exemptions can be colloquially
understood as “consumer property,”71 with one common and
notable exception—“tools of the trade.”72

70. Organized national efforts to reform state property exemption laws have failed
to gain any traction. For instance, in the 1970s, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State laws proposed a Uniform Exemptions Act. Only one state, Alaska,
adopted this Model Act. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 09.38.010, .015, .017 (West, Westlaw
through Chap. 13 of 2018 Second Regular Legis. Sess.). Intrastate calls for exemption reform
continue, though such calls are rare. See generally Lee Harrington, Time for Change: Bringing
Massachusetts Homestead and Personal Property Exemptions into the Twenty-First Century, 4
S. NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 1, 11–20 (2009).
71. Expanding Article 2 notions of “goods” to, here, include homesteads.
72. One “nonconsumer” category of an individual’s or family’s property commonly
protected under exemption laws is “tools of the trade.” This category is explicitly
mentioned in both federal and some state exemptions laws. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6)
(2016) (exempting a certain dollar amount of “any implements, professional books, or tools
of the trade of the debtor or the trade of any dependent of the debtor”). Some state
exemption statutes provide definitional parameters that are broad. For instance, the Texas
definition includes “tools, equipment, books, and apparatus, including boats and motor
vehicles used in a trade or profession . . . .” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(4) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Regular Sess. and First Called Legis. Sess.).
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A. General, Bankruptcy-Neutral State Exemptions
Most state exemption schemes assign specific dollar amounts
to each protected category. For instance, in Wyoming, each person
is entitled to exempt, among other things, $2,000 worth of
“wearing apparel.”73 In terms of personal property exemptions,
other states provide set dollar amounts and allow individuals to
“spend” this amount electing items from an approved list of
exemptible property. Texas, for instance, provides one of the most
generous aggregations for personal property, allowing an individual $50,000 and a family $100,000 budgeted to exempt items
from a list including home furnishings, wearing apparel, jewelry,
firearms, and “athletic and sporting equipment, including bicycles.”74 Almost no state employs a “wild card” feature, which
allows any unused dollar amount in one approved category to be
applied to another.75
Homestead exemptions, in particular, vary wildly from state
to state. For example, Wyoming allows a $20,000 homestead
exemption, while Washington has a homestead exemption of
$125,000.76 Nevada has a homestead exemption of $550,000.77
Famously, some states such as Texas and Florida have unlimited
homestead exemptions. At the other end of the spectrum,
Virginia’s homestead exemption is only $5,000.78 Similarly,
Kentucky and West Virginia both have a homestead exemption of
only $5,000.79

73. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-105 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Gen. Legis. Sess.).
74. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001–.002.
75. Federal exemptions provide a particularly advantageous “wild card” option. For

debtors living in states that have not opted out, a debtor who either (i) does not claim a
homestead exemption (read: renters or homeowners with little to no equity) or (ii) claims
but does not use the entire federal homestead exemption amount has the option of using
the lesser of $11,500 or the amount of unused homestead to exempt “any property.” 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). This wild card amount is in addition to other specific categories and
amounts listed in § 522(d)(1)–(4) and (6)–(12). See supra Section II.C.2.
76. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.030 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis.
Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-101.
77. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 115.010 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Regular Legis. Sess.).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis. Sess. and
Sp. Sess.).
79. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.060 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis. Sess.);
W. VA. CODE § 38-9-1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Legis. Sess).
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Another important exemption—the exemption for motor
vehicles—varies significantly among various states. Alaska has an
exemption for motor vehicles of $3,000 if the value of the car is
less than $20,000.80 California’s motor vehicle exemption only
allows an exemption for vehicles up to $2,300.81 Florida has one of
the lowest, providing only a $1,000 motor vehicle exemption.82
Georgia, on the other hand, does not have any motor vehicle
exemption.83 Nor does Pennsylvania.
As a general matter, there is neither continuity nor predictability with respect to the exemptions allowed by each state. For
example, Rhode Island has large homestead and motor vehicle
exemptions, with a $500,000 homestead and a $12,000 motor
vehicle exemption.84 By contrast, not only does Tennessee have a
low homestead exemption of only $5,000, it does not have a motor
vehicle exemption at all.85 Pennsylvania does not provide any sort
of homestead exemption, instead choosing to provide only a $300
exemption that may be applied to any property of the
judgment debtor.86
B. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemption Schemes
Since the passage of the Code, a small handful of states has
engaged in marginal experimentation with bankruptcy-specific
exemptions.87 Most of these experiments resulted in modest and
narrow bankruptcy-specific exemptions. For instance, Ohio, an
opt-out state, enacted a law permitting debtors in bankruptcy to
exempt four hundred dollars of “walking around” money in cash
80. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.38.020 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Second
Regular Legis. Sess.).
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.010 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Regular
Legis. Sess.).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.25 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Regular Legis. Sess.).
83. See GA . CODE ANN. § 44-13-1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.).
84. See R.I. GEN. LAWS A NN. §§ 9-26-4, 4.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 30, Jan. 2018
Legis. Sess.).
85. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Regular
Legis. Sess.).
86. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (West, Westlaw through 2018
Regular Sess. Acts 1–27, 30). However, Pennsylvania permits its residents to use federal
exemptions in bankruptcy.
87. See infra Appendix A for a summary of the state enactments of bankruptcyspecific exemptions and related cases.
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or a bank account.88 Other states provided enhanced exemption
rights in bankruptcy for property held in certain legal forms, such
as retirement accounts or pensions.89
Concerning bankruptcy-specific exemptions, states generally
fall into one of two camps. Most states have never formally
considered bankruptcy-specific exemptions. A much smaller group
of states has enacted modest and narrow bankruptcy-specific
exemptions that were later repealed or not expanded. The tepid
experimentation of the latter group can be explained, in part, by
legal challenges that chilled legislative action. In some cases,
courts determined that state bankruptcy-specific-exemption schemes
were unconstitutional. Some states responded by repealing the
affected statutes. Others simply stopped experimenting with
bankruptcy-specific exemptions. In fact, since the late 1990s,
Michigan and Delaware stand alone as the only states to have
undertaken an effort to pass meaningful, and somewhat comprehensive, reforms.90
Constitutional challenges have been leveled against state
bankruptcy-specific exemptions on two bases: that such schemes
(i) are preempted under the Supremacy Clause and (ii) run afoul of
the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement. In the face of
constitutional uncertainty, some states repealed their laws.91 While
impossible to predict or quantify with certainty, efforts in other

88. The pertinent section of the statute provides:

Every person who is domiciled in this state may hold property exempt from
execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a judgment or order, as
follows:
....
The person’s interest, not to exceed five hundred twenty-five dollars in any
particular item or ten thousand seven hundred seventy-five dollars in aggregate
value, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, firearms, and hunting and fishing
equipment that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of
the person . . . .
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A), (4)(a), (17) (West, Westlaw through File 66 of 2017–18
Gen. Assembly, 2017 State Issue 1, 2018 State Issue 1).
89. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-54-104 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 273 of
2018 Second Regular Sess.).
90. See infra Sections III.B and C.
91. See infra Appendix A.
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states were suppressed by conflicting court decisions concerning
whether bankruptcy-specific exemptions were constitutional.
III. STATE BANKRUPTCY-SPECIFIC EXEMPTION SCHEMES
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, state
legislative efforts to enact or expand bankruptcy-specific exemptions have occurred in an environment attended by uncertainty.
Much of this uncertainty springs from somewhat unresolved
questions concerning the constitutionality of these schemes.92
A. Prevailing “Permissive” Conception of Uniformity
The text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power to establish “uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”93 The historical context surrounding the inclusion of this
language in the Constitution is important, though not particularly enlightening. A fair characterization would stamp the
Bankruptcy Clause as a late addition to the Constitution. The
meaning and import of “uniform Laws” has been the subject of
much debate. Does “uniform” expand the power granted
Congress, or does it serve as a restriction on that power? In
essence, the Court has adopted a construction of “uniform”
consistent with the expanded power theory: Congress has the

92. One dynamic present in analyses of the constitutionality of these state laws is the
fact that they are, in fact, state laws. In the context of uniformity scrutiny, the Bankruptcy
Clause affects congressional actions, not state actions. For purposes of this article, a
simplified method of viewing constitutional challenges to state laws involves framing the
challenges as challenges to § 522 inasmuch as that section provides for the delegation of
both the opt-out decision as well as determination of appropriate exemptions to states.
Viewed this way, many of the attacks on state bankruptcy-specific exemptions actually
challenge the constitutionality of Congress’s delegation of these decisions to the states
within the construct of § 522. This distinction, while important and necessary, has been
glossed over by some courts. For instance, in determining that Indiana’s law survived a
uniformity challenge, a bankruptcy court simply concluded that the challenge “fails to
recognize that the Uniformity Clause is not a restriction upon the states.” In re Cross, 255
B.R. 25, 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000). The court did not analyze whether the delegation in
§ 522 could constitutionally permit a state to pass a bankruptcy-specific exemption law. Id.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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power to impose uniform bankruptcy laws that displace
state laws.
1. Doctrine of geographical uniformity
In 1902, the Court in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses
pronounced geographic uniformity as the outer limit of any
uniformity restriction posed by the Bankruptcy Clause.94 Later
cases eroded the efficacy of geographic uniformity as a limit, as
the Court confirmed bankruptcy laws that appeared to violate the
doctrine. Tellingly, the Court has only invoked uniformity to
invalidate a bankruptcy law on a single occasion: striking down a
bankruptcy law that, on its face, only applied to a single company.
The construction of uniformity as a power95 was recently invoked
by the Court to rationalize excepting state claims of sovereign
immunity from effect in bankruptcy proceedings.
Although the contours of uniformity have been meted out in a
handful of cases, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the effects of uniformity on bankruptcy exemptions since Moyses
in 1902. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Clause’s requirement of “uniform
Laws” in the specific context of bankruptcy exemptions has
seldom been probed.
Some early evidence supports the conclusion that the Framers
intended “uniform Laws” to prohibit delegation of bankruptcy exemption determinations to the states.96 The earliest bankruptcy acts
(in 1800 and 1841) were consistent with this restrictive interpretation by providing uniform federal bankruptcy exemptions to the
exclusion of state exemptions.97 Soon after the Civil War, Congress
passed the third bankruptcy act (in 1867) that included a provision
incorporating the exemptions laws of the states for the first time.

94. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
95. Formulating “uniform” as a source of enhancement to, rather than a restriction

on, Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause has been explored by some
commentators. For instance, Judge Randolph Haines argues in favor of the power
enhancement conception. Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is
Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129 (2003). In supporting his conclusion, Judge Haines focused
on the text, structure, context, and history of the language of the Bankruptcy Clause. Id.
at 165–70.
96. See id.
97. See id.
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The 1867 Act introduced a hybrid system of base federal exemptions that added state law exemptions. The three earliest bankruptcy acts were short-lived, and each was repealed within a few
years of being enacted.
In 1898, Congress passed a bankruptcy act that entirely omitted federal exemptions and relied completely on the exemption
laws of the states. The 1898 Act continued in force until Congress
passed the Code in 1978. In response to an early constitutional
challenge to the 1898 Act, the Court in Moyses upheld the constitutionality of incorporation of state exemptions in bankruptcy,98
establishing the doctrine of geographical uniformity as the
standard for uniformity challenges.99
a. Moyses sanctified non-uniform state laws in bankruptcy. Moyses
involved a constitutional challenge to a feature of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 that incorporated state law exemptions of the state
where a bankruptcy case was filed.100 The debtor had moved from
Missouri to Tennessee, and he filed bankruptcy in Tennessee
claiming the property exemptions provided by that state’s laws.
The debtor was granted a discharge using Tennessee exemptions.
The debtor’s bank claimed that the Act was unconstitutional and
violated the uniformity requirement by allowing incorporation of
state exemption laws. The Court rejected the bank’s “personal
uniformity” argument and announced that “uniformity is geographical.”101 The Court explained that constitutional uniformity
is satisfied “when the trustee [in bankruptcy] takes in each state
whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bankrupt law had not been passed.”102 Uniformity is not destroyed by
states having different exemption laws, as the “general operation
of the law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars
differently in different states.”103
Because geographical uniformity is not “personal,” Congress
was liberated to pass bankruptcy laws acknowledging and
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Moyses, 186 U.S. at 181.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 190. This language served as ammunition for attacks on bankruptcy specific
exemption schemes passed after the 1978 Code and § 522.
103. Id.
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incorporating differences in the laws of the various states, even
when those differences are stark, as in the case of state exemptions.
By requiring that bankruptcy laws merely ingrain procedural
uniformity, the Court began defining the contours of constitutional
uniformity in terms that were deferential to Congress.
As conceived in Moyses, and developed in later cases, uniformity became a permissive concept.104 The Court signaled, and
later ratified, the notion that bankruptcy laws will not fail under
uniformity challenges absent a procedural disuniformity that
treats members of the same class of debtors or creditors
differently. Inherent in this doctrine is substantial deference given
to Congress to define these “classes” of debtors and creditors.
Because the 1898 Act provided a mechanism for incorporating
exemption laws of the states, the base procedural uniformity
requirement was satisfied in Moyses; all debtors in Tennessee
could avail themselves of the Tennessee exemptions.
This permissive conception of uniformity finds some support
in history. While the circumstances surrounding the addition of
the Bankruptcy Clause during the Convention lend few clues to
the meaning of “uniform Laws,” some evidence suggests that
proponents were primarily concerned with Congress having the
power to impose uniform laws on the states.105 Prior to the
Constitution, many states had their own bankruptcy laws.
Problems arose from the absence of a mechanism to force one state
from recognizing a discharge granted by a sister state. Through
the Bankruptcy Clause and Contracts Clause, the Framers empowered Congress to grant discharges and expressly withheld
this power from States.
This historical evidence supports the idea that the
constitutional concept of “uniform” was designed to enhance
congressional power, not restrict it. As Justice Thomas noted in his
dissent in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, “the
historical record thus refutes, rather than supports, the majority’s
premise that the Framers placed paramount importance on the
enactment of a nationally uniform bankruptcy law.”106 As validated
104. See infra notes 107 and 111.
105. See, e.g., Haines, supra note 95, at 168–70.
106. Cent. Va. Comty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 386–87 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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in Moyses, constitutional uniformity does not prevent Congress
from incorporating non-uniform state laws into bankruptcy. In
cases subsequent to Moyses, the Court confirmed that “geographical uniformity” is satisfied if certain defined groups of debtors or
creditors receive uniform treatment. In fact, the Court upheld one
challenged bankruptcy law that applied only in a statutorily defined geographic region as satisfying the geographical uniformity
standard.107 Not surprisingly, the as-evolved doctrine has been
soundly criticized by scholars.108
b. Calcification of permissive uniformity as norm. The notion that
uniformity is ineffective as a substantive restriction on Congress’s
ability to craft bankruptcy legislation has become increasingly
unassailable. Outside of the exemptions context, Congress incorporating other non-uniform state laws and standards in bankruptcy has been attacked on uniformity grounds. In each such case,
the challenge has been unsuccessful. One high profile example,
often cited by scholars in discussing uniformity, is Stellwagen v.
Clum.109 In this case, the Court sanctified the incorporation of nonuniform state laws defining fraudulent conveyances into the
1898 Act.
In Stellwagen, the Court raised the uniformity issue sua sponte
and disposed of the bank’s argument summarily:
Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the
bankruptcy acts of Congress may recognize the laws of the State
in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to

107. See infra notes 141–47 and accompanying text.
108. In a seminal article on this topic, Professor Judith Koffler called for a reexam-

ination and, ultimately, the abandonment of the doctrine of geographical uniformity.
Koffler, supra note 59. Joining other voices, Professor Koffler provides a thoughtful
criticism of the doctrine and essentially calls for the abandonment of the permissive
conception of uniformity and a return to uniformity as a real limit on congressional action.
She rightly observes that the Court’s treatment of uniform laws “comes dangerously close
to suggesting that the constitutional language is surplusage.” Id. at 76. In the present
Article, uniformity is treated not as surplusage, but as an enhancement of congressional
power: a power, not a restriction. While no sober analysis of uniformity could now
question whether Congress has the power to impose uniform laws on the states, some
historical evidence suggests that this was precisely the concern during the time of the
Convention. In the exemptions context, this elicits an obvious question: Does uniformity
permit Congress to pass uniform bankruptcy exemptions that displace all state exemptions
in bankruptcy? Congress has and does.
109. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918).
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different results in different States. For example, the Bankruptcy
Act recognizes and enforces the laws of the States affecting
dower, exemptions, the validity of mortgages, priorities of
payment and the like. Such recognition in the application of state
laws does not affect the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act,
although in these particulars the operation of the act is not alike
in all the States.110

Largely due to this passage, Stellwagen is often cited for the
proposition that incorporating non-uniform state laws is allowable under uniformity analysis. 111
This deferential concept of uniformity has been applied in
contexts other than in challenges to bankruptcy laws that incorporate non-uniform state laws.112 By way of example, uniformity was
recently invoked to challenge the so-called eligibility test of § 707
of the Code. As part of the 2005 Amendments, Congress enacted a
new “means test” to determine whether debtors were eligible to
file Chapter 7. The idea behind the amendment was to subject
above-median-income debtors to a formula to determine whether
essentially they had “too much” discretionary income to file
Chapter 7. For debtors failing the test, the formula left Chapter 13,
under which the debtor’s discretionary income is committed to
bankruptcy for a period of thirty-six to sixty months, as the remaining consumer bankruptcy option.
Under this Chapter 7 eligibility formula, the primary variable
for eligibility is the median income for a similar household in the
debtor’s state. Because median incomes vary state-to-state, similarly
situated debtors in different states may have different eligibility
outcomes. For instance, debtors with identical incomes, assets,
and debts could find themselves in different positions: The debtor
living in a high median income state may be eligible for Chapter 7,

110. Id. at 613.
111. Some scholars have criticized Stellwagen for failing to discriminate among types

of state laws in terms, for instance, of whether those laws affect the size of the estate or
simply the validity or priority of claims. See Koffler, supra note 59, at 71–72.
112. Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws,” 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1081 (2012). Professor Austin explains that several factors contribute to the lack of
uniformity in bankruptcy, including incorporation of state laws, the existence of local rules
and procedures adopted by courts and trustees, and differing interpretations of key Code
provisions among the courts. Id.
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while the identical debtor in a low median income state may be
ineligible for Chapter 7.
In Schultz v. United States,113 the plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee while simultaneously filing a complaint for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee.114 The complaint for
declaratory judgment alleged that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (hereinafter the Act or
the BAPCPA) violated the uniformity clause set forth in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution.115 The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.116
As the Sixth Circuit noted, Congress enacted a new eligibility
standard in BAPCPA to require debtors in higher income brackets
to make more funds available for unsecured creditors.117 The Act
requires debtors to demonstrate financial eligibility to file a
Chapter 7 and allows a bankruptcy court to dismiss a debtor’s
petition filed under Chapter 7 or to convert the Chapter 7 filing to
a Chapter 13 filing if it appears that the “bankruptcy filing is an
abuse of the bankruptcy proceedings.”118
Under this test, the first step instructs the bankruptcy court to
compare the debtor’s annualized current monthly income to the
median family income of a similarly sized family in the debtor’s
state of residence. If the debtor’s current monthly income is equal
to or below the median, then the presumption of abuse does not
arise. If, however, it exceeds the median, the Act directs the court
to recalculate the debtor’s income by deducting certain necessary
expenses specified by the statute. These reductions are derived
from the national and local standards contained in the Internal
Revenue Service’s Financial Analysis Handbook.119

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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The effect of the eligibility test was to push more abovemedian-income debtors out of Chapter 7 liquidation and force
them into Chapter 13 reorganization. The fulcrum point is the
median income for the state in which debtor resides.120
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the United States challenging
the five sections of the BAPCPA that utilize this eligibility “means
test.”121 The plaintiffs asserted that the calculations, which are
based in part on the state and county in which the debtor resides,
are not uniform and thus are in violation of the Bankruptcy
Clause.122 The plaintiffs had an income of approximately $84,000,
which was above the median family income for a family of five in
Tennessee but below the median family income in several other
states.123 This impacted the expense deductions the plaintiffs could
claim under the BAPCPA.124 The district court concluded that the
uniformity requirement set forth in the Constitution “does not
proscribe different results in different states because of state law
variations.”125 Thus, the district court granted the government’s
motion for summary judgment.126
In response to the [Plaintiff’s] argument that the BAPCPA
amendments are unconstitutional because they create variations
in different states based on federal instead of state law, the
district court explained that there is “no principled reason for
concluding that variations resulting from federal statistics create
unconstitutional non-uniformity, whereas variations resulting
from state law do not.” The court concluded that “[d]isposable
income might vary from place to place, but it is based on
uniformly calculated national statistics. The variations in the
results produced by these statistics are of no constitutional
consequence.”127

Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.128
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
Id. (for example, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hampshire, and New Jersey).
124. Id. at 349.
125. Id. (citing Schultz v. United States, 369 B.R. 349, 352 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)).
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Schultz, 369 B.R. at 353 (internal citations omitted)).
128. Id.
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The main question resolved by the Sixth Circuit was whether
the BAPCPA provision incorporating non-uniform state median
income levels is a “uniform Law on the subject of bankruptcy.”129
“The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the
power to ‘establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.’”130 Quoting Chief
Justice Marshall, the Sixth Circuit noted that “Congress is not
authorized merely to pass laws, the operation of which shall be
uniform, but instead to establish uniform laws on the subject
throughout the United States.”131 The plaintiffs in this case argued
that the scheme adopted by Congress, which takes into account a
debtor’s income compared to the median income of a particular
state, violates the Bankruptcy Clause.132 Specifically, the scheme
results in debtors receiving different relief based on the state or
country in which they reside.133 The concept of personal
uniformity is implicit in the plaintiff’s argument—that is, the
notion that the laws should apply to all debtors in the same way
regardless of where the debtor resides.134 However, the Supreme
Court has “consistently described the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement as ‘geographical, and not personal . . . .’”135
This requirement is “satisfied when existing obligations of a
debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy administration
throughout the country regardless of the State in which the
bankruptcy court sits . . . .”136
This geographical uniformity requirement does not prohibit
different effects in various states due to variations in state law,
provided that the federal law applies uniformly among the classes
of debtors.137 Quoting Moyses, the court noted that “[t]he general
operation of [a] law is uniform although it may result in certain

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 350.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
Id. (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193–94 (1819)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 351 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902)).
Id. (quoting Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
137. Id.
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particulars differently in different states.”138 Congress may pass
non-uniform laws to address “geographically isolated problems”
provided the law operates “uniformly upon a given class of
creditors and debtors.”139 The uniformity requirement “does not
deny Congress power to take into account differences that exist
between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation
to resolve geographically isolated problems . . . appl[ied] equally
to all creditors and debtors.”140
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Chapter 7 eligibility
provision of BAPCPA is a constitutionally “uniform law.”141 Thus,
Congress could constitutionally distinguish among different
classes of debtors, and this may be accomplished “through the
incorporation of varying state laws.”142 BAPCPA employs a means
test that utilizes income calculations in accordance with the IRS
Handbook’s national and local standards.143 As the court stated,
BAPCPA is uniform in form: all debtors whose income is above
the median family income are treated alike, as are all debtors
whose income falls below. The resulting differences based on the
state in which the debtor resides are analytically indistinguishable from the differences resulting from the incorporation of
various state laws.144

The Bankruptcy Clause does not prohibit Congress from
considering the differences that exist between various parts of
the country.145
2. Limits of permissive uniformity: discriminatory regionalism through
“private laws”
Although the constitutional call for “uniform Laws” has settled
into the highly deferential doctrine of geographic uniformity,
138. Id. (“Geographic uniformity in this context, the Court observed, was satisfied
‘when the trustee takes in each state whatever would have been available if the bankrupt
law had not been passed.’”) (quoting Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190).
139. Id. (citing Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974)).
140. Id. (quoting Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 159, 160) (internal citations omitted)).
141. Id. at 352.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 353.
145. Id.
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Congress does not enjoy complete discretion in enacting bankruptcy laws to its liking. The point at which the permissive
construction yields to uniformity as a restriction on congressional
action is illustrated by two railroad cases: (i) Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases from 1974 and (ii) Railway Labor Executives
Association v. Gibbons from 1982 (the Rail Act Cases). 146
In the Rail Act Cases, the Court upheld against a uniformity
challenge a bankruptcy law147 that applied to a geographically
exclusive area—”the midwest and northeast region.”148 The Rail
Act had been passed in response to a congressional finding that
then-existing bankruptcy law could not adequately address a
transportation crisis precipitated by eight railroads from that
geographic region entering bankruptcy. Congress created the Rail
Act to allow these railroads to reorganize more expeditiously
under a single entity, a Conrail. The Rail Act was challenged on
the basis that it violated geographic uniformity by applying to
only a specific statutorily defined geographic region.
Largely avoiding a discussion of Moyses, the 8–1 majority
opinion acknowledged the “surface appeal” of the argument that
the Rail Act facially violated geographic uniformity.149 In rejecting
this argument, however, the Court determined that the
Bankruptcy Clause uniformity challenge “overlooks the flexibility
inherent in the constitutional provision.”150 Invoking this
“inherent flexibility,” the Court upheld the Rail Act on two bases:
(1) that no railroads outside the defined region were in bankruptcy and (2) that the Act operated uniformly with respect to
all creditors.151
In a more recent case and the sole instance in which the Court
found a violation of uniformity, the limit of the permissive norm
146. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n
v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
147. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act), Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat.
985 (1974) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–797m (West Supp. 1982)).
148. Id. at § 701.
149. Justice Douglas provided the lone voice in the wilderness, by noting in his
dissent that the Court had “never dreamed of allowing debtors in the same class and their
creditors to be treated more leniently in one region than in another.” Reg’l Rail, 419 U.S. at
102, 184 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
150. Reg’l Rail, 419 U.S. at 158.
151. Id. at 156–61.
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of uniformity was illustrated when the Court struck down a
bankruptcy law that applied to a single debtor in Gibbons.152 In
short, the Court held that while uniformity permitted Congress to
make geographical distinctions based on regions, a bankruptcy
law “must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of
debtors.”153 With little analysis, the Court observed that “[a]
bankruptcy law . . . confined as it is to the affairs of one named
debtor can hardly be considered uniform.”154
B. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemptions Are
Constitutionally “Uniform”
Congress can delegate exemptions in bankruptcy to the states.
In Moyses, the Court provided a specific sanctification of Congress
delegating exemptions in bankruptcy to the states. While the
doctrine of geographic uniformity has been roundly criticized,
cases subsequent to Moyses essentially eviscerated the notion that
uniformity is a meaningful restriction on congressional action in
the realm of bankruptcy legislation. The Rail Act Cases called into
focus whether and to what extent facial geographical disuniformity is permissible, as the act applied only to certain areas of
the country. The Court relied on the “inherent flexibility” of the
Bankruptcy Clause and deferred to Congress when it perceived
legislation was procedurally uniform and free from any hint of
discriminatory regionalism. Though the challenged act applied
exclusively to a defined region, application of the law was in fact
agnostic to geography, as there were no bankrupt railroads
outside the defined region at the time of the act. By contrast,
Gibbons marked the extreme of the regionalism spectrum, in both
form and application—a bankruptcy act applying to a single
named railroad company and excluding other railroad companies
in bankruptcy at the time of the act.
Since in Moyses the Court upheld delegating exemptions to
states in bankruptcy under the 1898 Act, how is the existing
concurrent system—including the opt-out—different, and do

152. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 457.
153. Id. at 473.
154. Id.
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those differences dictate a result contrary to Moyses? How does
the post-Moyses distillation of uniformity as a failing source of
restriction on Congress’s power factor into the issue?
The most compelling uniformity argument against state
bankruptcy-specific exemptions being allowed under § 522 relies
on language from Moyses elaborating the standard for geographic
uniformity. In upholding the provision of the 1898 Act delegating
bankruptcy exemptions to the states, the Moyses Court explained
that a bankruptcy exemptions scheme “is, in the constitutional
sense, uniform throughout the United States, when the [bankruptcy] trustee takes in each [s]tate whatever would have been
available to the creditors if the bankrupt[cy] law had not been
passed.”155 A surface application of this rule to any state
bankruptcy-specific scheme suggests constitutional infirmity.
Under state laws that provide more generous exemptions in
bankruptcy, a trustee would take less in bankruptcy than a
creditor would take but for bankruptcy. In essence, the actual
purpose of proposed state reforms is this result: allowing a debtor
to keep the amounts and types of property to enable a fresh start.
The surface application of this rule from Moyses fails, however,
for several reasons.156 First and foremost, the notion of “uniform”
has expanded since Moyses, and that expansion demonstrates that
the delegation of exemptions policy in § 522 can constitutionally
permit state bankruptcy-specific exemptions. In 1902, when Moyses
was decided, the doctrine of geographic uniformity was announced. The fundamental principle of this doctrine was that the
uniformity required by the Bankruptcy Clause is geographic and
not personal. The Moyses Court specifically acknowledged that
geographic uniformity permitted different outcomes in bankruptcy
in different states. Indeed, by completely delegating bankruptcy
155. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
156. A careful reading of Moyses calls into question whether the quoted language

prohibits state laws that result in the trustee taking a different amount in bankruptcy than a
creditor would take under state law but for bankruptcy. The Court explained that an
exemptions system that adheres to this standard is constitutionally uniform. Absent,
however, was any explicit determination that an exemptions system failing this standard
would be unconstitutional. In this sense, the “trustee takes same as creditor” requirement
can be viewed as sufficient but not necessary to establish constitutionality of a given
exemptions system. At a minimum, this practical construction of the rule calls into question
the efficacy of this language of Moyses as fatal to state bankruptcy-specific exemptions.
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exemptions policy to the states, the 1898 Act essentially required
different outcomes in different states. Those outcomes were determined by the state in which a debtor filed bankruptcy.
A strong case exists that applying Moyses to § 522 would
invalidate the federal exemptions, not the opt-out provision.157
Recall that a bankruptcy exemptions scheme “is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States, when the
[bankruptcy] trustee takes in each state whatever would have
been available to the creditor if the bankrupt[cy] law had not been
passed.” Strict application of this rule would strike down the
federal exemptions listed in § 522(d). Had the bankruptcy law, in
this case the Code, not been passed, what the trustee takes would
be determined solely and exclusively by state general exemptions
laws. Hence, to the extent the federal exemptions conflict with the
general state exemptions, Moyses would view the federal exemptions as lacking constitutional uniformity.
Since Moyses, the doctrine of geographical uniformity has been
confirmed to be impotent as a means to challenge bankruptcy
legislation. At each opportunity, the Court has consistently and
substantially eroded any restrictions imposed by the doctrine.
Bankruptcy laws can now apply to statutorily defined regions of
the country to the exclusion of other regions. During this expansion, the “geography” component of uniformity has been debased
and essentially replaced with the requirement that bankruptcy
laws be procedurally uniform. Bankruptcy laws are not constitutionally uniform if they treat defined sets of creditors evenhandedly. Alternatively, uniformity is satisfied if defined sets of
debtors are treated in a procedurally uniform manner.
The Court has signaled this deferential, indeed permissive,
conception of uniformity through pronouncements not essential
to holdings in several cases. Most notably, the Court in the Rail
Act Cases took a significant step toward reading the restrictiveness
of uniformity out of the Bankruptcy Clause altogether by

157. Several scholars have criticized the as-evolved doctrine of geographic uniformity
as incoherent. I do not defend the coherence of the doctrine. Instead, I use the as-evolved
doctrine to support a conclusion that state bankruptcy exemptions would survive a
uniformity challenge.
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announcing the “flexibility inherent.”158 While striking down a
single-entity bankruptcy law as violating uniformity, the Court
took occasion to continue to signal the deferential—even
permissive—conception of uniformity.
C. State Bankruptcy-Specific Exemptions Are Not Preempted
Under the Supremacy Clause
Although constitutional uniformity might not proscribe state
bankruptcy-specific exemptions, what about the argument that
such exemptions are “bankruptcy laws” that are preempted under
the Supremacy Clause? The argument can be facially appealing.
The Bankruptcy Clause grants authority to Congress to pass
bankruptcy laws, and it exercised that authority by enacting the
Bankruptcy Code. How can state laws that apply only in
bankruptcy not be preempted?
The primary preemption argument against the concurrent
exemption scheme draws strength from, and ascribes constitutionally significant meaning to, the detailed federal exemptions
contained in § 522. Congress has determined what exemptions
should be in bankruptcy. Preemption proponents urge that state
exemptions that are “less generous”159 than the federal counterparts are preempted, since Congress has determined appropriate
exemption levels in bankruptcy. For example, concluding that
California’s bankruptcy-specific exemption was unconstitutional,
a bankruptcy court in 2008 determined that Congress had
preempted state bankruptcy-only exemption schemes that were
inconsistent with § 522.160 The court relied on an oft-quoted
articulation of the rule of field preemption: “Congress’s intent to
supersede state law altogether may be found from a ‘scheme of
federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the

158. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918).
159. This preemption argument essentially requires a standard for determining

whether a challenged state exemption scheme is, in fact, “less generous.” States with
high or unlimited homestead exemptions are certainly more generous to bankrupt
homeowners than federal exemptions allow. How would this factor into determining
whether the state’s exemptions are “generous” enough? This Article recasts the question
as one of the functionality of exemptions, rather than the degree to which they are
generous. See infra Section IV.A.
160. In re Regevig, 389 B.R. 736, 740 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008).
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inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.’”161 In the absence of Congress providing pervasive regulation162 in a field, state laws remain unconstitutional to the extent
they conflict with federal law under the “conflict preemption”
doctrine. The bankruptcy court determined that in § 522 Congress
had “pervasively defined the exemptions that a state may permit a
debtor to claim only in a bankruptcy case.”163 This reasoning
appears to ignore how the opt-out provision delegates to states
the ultimate exemptions decision.
Given this context, should the federal opt-out provision (and
resulting state laws) be subject to preemption challenges? The
short answer is “no.” This is especially true for any state
undertaking the “meaningful review” process envisioned by this
Article and the Model.
1. The genesis of preemption is state interference with the purpose and
objectives of bankruptcy law
The beginning of any bankruptcy preemption issue is Perez v.
Campbell.164 In Perez, the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of an Arizona law that permitted the state to withhold a
driver’s license conditioned on payment of claim related to an
automobile accident when that claim had been discharged in
bankruptcy.165 More particularly, petitioners asserted the Arizona
161. Id. (quoting Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005)).
162. The Court offers a succinct, yet more thorough, description of field preemption in

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission:
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’ [sic] intent to supersede state
law altogether may be found from a “‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to
supplement it,’ because ‘the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,’ or because ‘the object
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.’”
461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983) (quoting Fid. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982)).
163. Regevig, 389 B.R. at 740.
164. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
165. In 1965, the petitioners were involved in an automobile accident in Tucson, and
the automobile was not covered by liability insurance at the time of the accident. Id. The
driver of the second car was the minor daughter of the Pinkertons, who sued the
petitioners in state court. Id. The petitioners confessed judgment, and a judgment order was
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law’s requirement that the judgment be paid in order for the
petitioner’s driver’s license to be reinstated directly conflicted
with the Bankruptcy Act and was, therefore, in violation of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.166 Stated differently, the
issue in Perez was whether the state has the power to interfere
with the bankruptcy discharge of an automobile accident tort
judgment “insofar as such repayment may be enforced by the
withholding of driving privileges [of the debtor] by the State.”167
The Court articulated a two-step process for determining
whether a state statute conflicts with a federal statute and thus is
invalid under the Supremacy Clause.168 First, the Court must
ascertain the construction of the two statutes.169 Next, the Court
must determine whether the two statutes are in fact in conflict.170

entered against them in the amount of $2,425.98 plus court costs. Id. The petitioners filed a
voluntary bankruptcy petition in 1967. Id. The District Court entered orders discharging the
petitioners from all debts and claims against their estates, including the Pinkerton
judgment. Id. at 639. While the Court noted that only one provision of the Arizona Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (“Arizona Act”) is relevant to the issue at hand, the Court
described the statutory scheme overall to give context to the statute at issue. Id. at 639–42.
The substantive provisions of the Arizona Act begin in Article 3, which requires those
involved in accidents to post financial security. Id. It furthermore provides that anyone
who unlawfully fails to report an accident is subject to the suspension of his or her license.
Id. Article 4 addresses the suspension of licenses and registrations for nonpayment of
judgments, and this is the only provision of the Arizona Act at issue in Perez. Id. Under the
Arizona Act, it is only when the judgment debtor in an automobile accident lawsuit fails to
respond to a judgment that has been entered against him that “he must overcome two
hurdles in order to regain his driving privileges.” Id. at 637. When a judgment has
remained unsatisfied for sixty days after entry of the judgment, the state court clerk must
forward a certified copy of the judgment to the superintendent. The state court clerk in this
case complied with this requirement, and the petitioners were notified that their drivers’
licenses and registration were suspended. Article 4 further provides that a “discharge in
bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judgment
debtor from any of the requirements of this article.” Id.
166. Perez, 402 U.S. at 643.
167. Id. (“What is at issue here is the power of a State to include as part of this
comprehensive enactment designed to secure compensation for automobile accident
victims a section providing that a discharge in bankruptcy of the automobile accident tort
judgment shall have no effect on the judgment debtor’s obligation to repay the judgment
creditor, at least insofar as such repayment may be enforced by the withholding of driving
privileges by the State.”).
168. Id. at 644.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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As noted in Perez, the Arizona statute at issue had been
construed by Arizona courts.171 The Supreme Court of Arizona
determined, in Schecter v. Killingsworth, that the Arizona Act’s
principal purpose is the protection of the public using the
highways “from financial hardship which may result from the use
of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.”172 The sole
purpose of the Arizona Act, according to the United States
Supreme Court, was to provide leverage to aid in collecting
damages from drivers who either admit that they are at fault or
are found to be at fault by a court.173
The construction of the Bankruptcy Act was clear:174
This Court on numerous occasions has stated that “[o]ne of the
primary purposes of the bankruptcy act [sic]” is to give debtors
“a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”175

Thus, Congress clearly intended that the “new opportunity”
referenced above include “freedom from most kinds of preexisting tort judgments.”176
The Court noted that “[w]ith the construction of both statutes
clearly established,” it would move to the constitutional question
of whether a state statute that protects judgment creditors from
drivers who are financially irresponsible conflicts with a federal
statute that provides debtors a fresh start.177 The Court’s analysis
referenced Chief Justice Marshall’s 1824 statement in Gibbons v.
Ogden that actions of the state legislatures that interfere with or

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. (citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1963)).
Id. at 646–47.
Id. at 648.
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934));
accord, e.g., Harris v. Zion’s Sav. Bank & Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v.
Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–
55 (1915).
176. Id. at 648.
177. Id. at 649 (“With the construction of both statutes clearly established, we proceed
immediately to the constitutional question whether a state statute that protects judgment
creditors from ‘financially irresponsible persons’ is in conflict with a federal statute that
gives discharged debtors a new start ‘unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.’”).
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are contrary to the laws of Congress are invalid under the
Supremacy Clause.178 Justice Black similarly wrote the following
in Hines v. Davidowitz:
[W]hile “[t]his Court, in considering the validity of state laws in
the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject,
ha[d] made use of the following expressions: conflicting;
contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference[,] . . . [i]n the final analysis,” our function is to determine
whether a challenged state statute “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”179

Since the Court’s decision in Hines, it has followed this
articulation of the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.180
The Perez Court then addressed two previous cases that,
despite the standard set forth by the Court in Hines, “ignored this
controlling principle.”181 In Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of
Utah, the Court had addressed the issue of whether Utah’s Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act conflicted with the Bankruptcy
Act and was thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause.182 The
Perez Court, in addressing the Kesler decision, noted that “[t]he
Court in Kesler conceded that Utah’s financial responsibility law
left ‘the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the discharged
debt,’ made ‘it more probable that the debt will be paid despite
the discharge,’ and thereby made ‘some inroad . . . on the
consequences of bankruptcy.’”183 Essentially, Utah’s statute
“frustrated Congress’ [sic] policy of giving discharged debtors a

178. Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 (1824)).
179. Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Hines v.

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
180. Id. See, e.g., Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 240 (1967); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Cont’l
Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (dictum); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962); Hill
v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542–43 (1945); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942).
181. Perez, 402 U.S. at 650.
182. Kesler v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 154–56 (1962) (overruled in
part by Perez, 402 U.S. 637).
183. Perez, 402 U.S. at 650 (internal citations omitted).
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new start.”184 Despite this conclusion, the Kesler Court upheld the
statute, claiming that the statute was designed to enforce a policy
against irresponsible driving and was not aimed at helping
creditors collect debts owed to them.185
The Kesler Court did not focus on the effect of the Utah
statute. Rather it concluded that because the purpose of the Utah
statute was to promote safety on Utah’s highways and not to
circumvent the Bankruptcy Act, the statute did not conflict with
the Act. 186 The dissent, on the other hand, reached the opposite
conclusion. 187 The Kesler dissent stated that, while the purpose of
the Utah statute may not have been to circumvent the
Bankruptcy Act, the “’plain and inevitable effect’” of the Utah
statute “‘[was] to create a powerful weapon for collection of a
debt from which [the] bankrupt [had] been released by federal
law.”188 Upholding such a statute, according to the dissent,
would allow the States to impair an important policy “embodied
in [this Nation’s] bankruptcy laws.”189
The Court’s previous decision in Reitz,190 according to the Perez
Court, similarly reached the wrong conclusion.191 The Reitz Court
focused on the purpose of the state statute at issue, rather than the
fact that the statute “frustrated the operation of the Bankruptcy
Act . . . .”192 The New York statute at issue in Reitz provided for
the suspension of the operator’s license and registration if a
judgment against him for injury to another person or property
resulting from operation of a motor vehicle was not paid within
fifteen days of judgment.193 The Reitz Court noted that the purpose
184. Id.
185. Id. (“Utah’s statute, in short, frustrated Congress’ [sic] policy of giving dischar-

ged debtors a new start. But the Kesler majority was not concerned by this frustration. In
upholding the statute, the majority opinion did not look to the effect of the legislation but
simply asserted that the statute was ‘not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors,’ and
was ‘not designed to aid collection of debts but to enforce a policy against irresponsible
driving . . . .’” (internal citation omitted)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Kesler v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 183 (1962)).
189. Id. (quoting Kesler, 369 U.S. at 185).
190. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941) (overruled in part by Perez, 402 U.S. 637).
191. Perez, 402 U.S. at 651.
192. Id.
193. Reitz, 314 U.S. at 35.
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of the New York statute would be frustrated if drivers were
permitted to escape the application of the statute simply by filing
a voluntary bankruptcy petition.194
The penalty which [the New York statute] imposes for injury
due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor
merely, but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers
shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The
scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless
driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple
expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in
derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of
permissible state policy touching highway safety.195

Thus, the majority in Reitz focused on the fact that the statute’s
purpose was aimed at creating safer highways rather than impairing the Bankruptcy Act.196 The dissent, however, argued that
the New York statute circumvented the Bankruptcy Act and
effectively ensured that bankruptcy “[was not] the sanctuary for
hapless debtors which Congress intended.”197
After analyzing the Kesler and Reitz decisions, the Perez Court
reiterated its position that Kesler and Reitz are no longer good
law.198 Applying a doctrine that focuses on the purpose of the state
statute at issue rather than its effect would be at odds with nearly
all previous decisions regarding the Supremacy Clause.199 In addition, “such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify
nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a
legislative committee report articulating some state interest or
policy—other than frustration of the federal objective—that would
be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.”200 The Court

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Perez, 402 U.S. at 651 (citing Reitz, 314 U.S. at 37).
Id. (quoting Reitz, 314 U.S. at 37).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Reitz, 314 U.S. at 41).
Id. at 651–52 (“We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler and
Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature
in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration.”).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 652.
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acknowledged that it is possible to make an argument that Kessler
and Reitz are confined to bankruptcy cases or highway safety
cases, but the Court quickly dismissed this argument by noting
that there is no reason as to why the States should have “broader
power to nullify federal law in these fields than in others.”201 As a
result, the Court held that Kesler and Reitz have no authoritative
effect because they are inconsistent with the application of the
Supremacy Clause.202
Even accepting the analysis of the Supremacy Clause promulgated in Kesler and Reitz—that is, looking at the purpose of the
law rather than the effect of the law—those decisions were not
dispositive in Perez.203 In both Kesler and Reitz the courts assumed,
without supporting case law, that the purpose of the laws was to
deter irresponsible driving rather than to provide relief to
creditors.204 Here, the Arizona Supreme Court declared that the
purpose of the Arizona statute was to protect the public from
financial hardship “resulting from involvement in traffic accidents
with uninsured motorists unable to respond to a judgment.”205
The Kesler Court declared that the purpose of the Utah statute was
not to aid in the collection of debts and therefore could be upheld,
although the source of support for this declaration is “unclear.”206
In Perez, the Court noted that the Arizona statute has an express
purpose of protecting judgment creditors from financial hardship
by giving them a tool to force bankrupts to pay their debts despite
their discharge in bankruptcy, which is “precisely the sort of
statute that Kesler would have stricken down . . . .”207
Whereas the Acts in Kesler and Reitz had the effect of frustrating
federal law but had, the Court said, no such purpose, the
Arizona Act has both that effect and that purpose. Believing as

201. Id.
202. Id. (“Thus, we conclude that Kesler and Reitz can have no authoritative effect to

the extent they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state legislation
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the
Supremacy Clause.”).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 652–53.
205. Id. at 654 (quoting Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963)).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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we do that Kesler and Reitz are not in harmony with sound
constitutional principle, they certainly should not be extended to
cover this new and distinguishable case.208

Thus, the Court in Perez held the Arizona Safety Responsibility
Act invalid under the Constitution.209
2. State bankruptcy-specific exemptions further, rather than interfere or
conflict with, the purposes and objectives of bankruptcy law
Against this backdrop of preemption jurisprudence, is it likely
that state bankruptcy-specific exemptions are repugnant to
Supremacy? Does providing debtors in bankruptcy “more generous” exemption rights than debtors outside bankruptcy interfere
with congressional objectives and purposes?
In thinking about preemption in this context, it is tempting
to draw on conventional notions of cooperative federalism.210

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Essentially, cooperative federalism programs allow the state agencies to “step

into the shoes of the federal agency” in order to enact federal regulations. Philip J. Weiser,
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1692, 1696 (2001). One of the most imperative features of a cooperative federalism
program is the careful balance struck between total preemption by the federal statute and
“uncoordinated federal and state action in distinct regulatory spheres (a dual federalism).”
Id. at 1697. The cooperative federalism model is a blend between these two extremes. Id.
Under the cooperative federalism approach, Congress and federal agencies are charged
with constructing the basic framework that defines the state agencies’ authority, as well as
determining a uniform minimum standard applicable to all states. Id. The state agencies are
then given the power to supplement this framework. Id. at 1698. Generally speaking,
cooperative federalism encourages the states to use discretion in determining how best to
implement the federal laws, thereby allowing for diversity in the federal regulatory
program. Id. at 1698 (“In particular, there are at least three related reasons why the federal
government has decided to promote diversity in federal regulatory regimes: (1) to allow
states to tailor federal regulatory programs to local conditions; (2) to promote competition
within a federal regulatory framework; and (3) to permit experimentation with different
approaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strategy.”). Congress has
continued to endorse cooperative federalism throughout the years, beginning in the 1970s
with the passage of key environmental statutes. Sarah C. Rispin, Cooperative Federalism and
Constructive Waiver of State Sovereign Immunity, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1642 (2003). These
federal statutes ultimately rely on state agencies to enact local regulations that comport
with national standards. Id. at 1643. An example of such a scheme is the Clean Air Act,
which sets national ambient air quality standards but allows the states to determine how
best to reach such standards. Id. at 1643. Other cooperative federalism schemes include
Medicaid, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act, and the Telecom Act. Id. at 1642–43. “By having the local government bodies
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Cooperative federalism assumes and requires uniform federal
standards being enforced by state agencies. If the specific
exemptions listed in § 522(d) are the uniform standards, then
state action adopting standards (i.e., exemptions) different from
the federal standards could be preempted. This analysis completely ignores the opt-out provision. Congress made a deliberate
choice to permit states to preempt the federal exemptions by
opting out of them. Traditional concepts of cooperative federalism
simply don’t fit. Attacks on the constitutionality of the opt-out
provision have been uniformly unsuccessful. As a result, the
treatment of exemptions under the Bankruptcy Code provide an
unfamiliar structure.
The concurrent exemptions system presents, then, the
somewhat unique case of Congress adopting a uniform standard
and authorizing a state to preempt that standard with its own. By
providing the opt-out, Congress has removed the federal exemptions as uniform standards per se. Instead, the specific federal
exemptions serve two functions: (i) providing an alternative set of
standards available to each state and (ii) signaling lineaments that
Congress deems important for exemptions to fulfill the “fresh
start” objective.
Because Congress has provided explicit authority for states to
pass controlling exemptions standards, preemption under a
cooperative federalism analysis is likely inapplicable—which
leaves courts with the traditional bankruptcy preemption analysis
from Perez.
Perhaps most critically, the Court in Perez confirmed the
construction of the Bankruptcy Act.211 “This Court on numerous
occasions has stated that ‘[o]ne of the primary purposes of the
bankruptcy act’ [sic] is to give debtors ‘a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and

implement federal regulation locally, these statutes preserve a role for the states in areas
that the federal political branches have decided it is in the nation’s best interest to regulate
according to a central design.” Id. at 1643.
211. Construing the 1898 Act. All evidence suggests that the 1978 Act continues these
fundamental purposes. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
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discouragement of preexisting debt.’”212 States enacting targeted
exemptions could simply be viewed as picking up the federal
baton by invigorating the “fresh start” through more appropriate
exemptions in bankruptcy.
IV. A MODEL FOR STATE BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS REFORM
Michigan stands as one of only two states213 that have passed a
somewhat comprehensive bankruptcy-specific exemptions scheme.
Perhaps ironically, the Michigan experiment was actually a
modest response, resulting from an opaque political compromise,
to a bolder call for broader general exemption reform. In fact, the
Michigan reforms were “bankruptcy-specific” almost by accident
as an apparent result of the legislative trading process.214
This Article does not proffer Michigan as a model for other
states to follow. Instead, the Michigan case is an example of state
legislative reform effort that resulted in actual legislation:
bankruptcy-specific exemptions becoming law. Indeed, the central
features of the Michigan scheme fail to address the Fresh Start
Function of exemptions in bankruptcy. The reform, while in some
sense “comprehensive,” did not result from a process and model
resembling those proposed herein.
The most noteworthy feature of Michigan’s reform is the
substantial expansion of the homestead exemption for individuals
in bankruptcy.215 Outside of bankruptcy, a homeowner in Michigan
can protect $3,500 in home equity. A debtor filing bankruptcy can
protect $30,000 with the possibility of expanding that dollar
amount to $45,000.216 Categories of property other than homestead
are also treated differently under the Michigan reform.217

212. Perez, 402 U.S. at 648 (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934));
accord, e.g., Harris v. Zion’s Sav. Bank & Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. Clum,
245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915).
213. The other state is Delaware.
214. See, e.g., In re Sassak, 426 B.R. 680, 687–89 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
215. See Thomas R. Morris, The Michigan Exemption Initiative, MICH. BUS. L.J.,
Summer 2011, at 14; Thomas R. Morris, The History and Future of Michigan Debtor Exemptions, MICH . BUS. L.J., Summer 2010, at 57 [hereinafter The History and Future of Michigan
Debtor Exemptions].
216. The History and Future of Michigan Debtor Exemptions, supra note 215.
217. Id.
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Perhaps the most notable contribution of the Michigan reform is
that it survived Uniformity and Supremacy challenges.218 The
importance of this survival cannot be overstated: A state-enacted
bankruptcy-specific exemption that applied only to residents
filing bankruptcy was determined to be constitutional by the
Sixth Circuit. 219
The Michigan reform and its vindication by the Sixth Circuit
provide a powerful impetus for reform efforts by other states.
Reforms resulting from the “meaningful review” process designed to serve the Fresh Start Function will stand on more solid
constitutional ground than the Michigan reform, as those reforms
were prompted by generalized concerns of “updating” and
“liberalizing” exemptions. The Michigan reform resulted from
opaque political wrangling and compromises, rather than from a
deliberate process of enacting bankruptcy-specific exemptions for
the express purpose of having exemptions designed to serve the
Fresh Start Function.
States that have opted out of federal exemptions should
undertake meaningful reexaminations of their existing exemptions to ensure that their schemes serve the Fresh Start Function of
bankruptcy. This assertion begs, of course, the question of what
qualities of exemptions further a debtor’s “fresh start.”
A. The Model
As discussed earlier, some may find it difficult to reconcile
state bankruptcy-specific exemptions with federal bankruptcy law
under the Supremacy Clause. The proposed reform model (the
Model) settles this issue in two respects. First, it provides some
factors that opt-out states can and should follow in serving the
Fresh Start Function. The inquiry is recast not as a determination
of generousness, but functionality. The factors inject a measure of
objectivity that can be followed in the legislative process.
The second issue relates directly to preemption. A state that
has reexamined its exemptions in light of the Model will have
findings and a record that its exemption scheme, reformed or not,

218. In re Shafer, 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012).
219. Id.
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is designed to serve the Fresh Start Function. Such a record,
ideally buttressed by smarter and more effective exemptions
resulting from this review process, would seriously undercut any
preemption attack. A state that has opted out but also undertaken
a meaningful effort to provide exemptions to assist debtors in the
Fresh Start Function would have fulfilled this purpose.
This purpose is in the nature of “cooperative federalism.”220
Unlike the traditional doctrine of cooperative federalism, however, the uniform bankruptcy exemptions set by Congress are
viewed not as providing a concrete substantive standard but
rather an illustrative set of standards based on the more
fundamental purpose—fresh start—to be advanced. I label this
federalism structure “quasi-cooperative federalism,”221 as the
actual standards can (and, perhaps, should) depend on variables
220. The Supremacy Clause empowers Congress to enact regulations in support of
Congress’s enumerated powers that “completely displace state regulation[s] and
implement a purely federal regulatory scheme.” Rispin, supra note 210, at 1642. Despite this
power to enact preemptive federal laws, Congress may choose to partner with state
governments in certain areas preempted by federal regulations when Congress deems such
a partnership to be beneficial. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized
Congress’s power to “offer States the choice of regulating [an] activity according to federal
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.” See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 764 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289
(1981). The Supreme Court has called such an arrangement “a program of cooperative
federalism.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289. In such a program, rather than preempting the authority
of state governments, Congress may instead choose to invite state agencies to administer
federal law. Weiser, supra note 210, at 1695. Cooperative federalism programs provide
uniform federal standards set forth in either a statute or federal agency regulation (or both),
but such statutes or regulations also allow the state governments flexibility in implementing the federal law. Id. at 1696. For example, the states may choose to “supplement
[the federal law] with more stringent standards,” or possibly seek exemptions from the
requirements set forth in the statute or regulation altogether. Id. These types of schemes
allow Congress to employ diversity in the federal framework by permitting states to
experiment with different approaches. Id. at 1695–96.
221. Admittedly, a limitation of this idea is that it has not yet been developed in other
federal/state contexts. A few obvious, yet unanswered, questions arise: Does quasicooperative federalism impose an actual duty on the states to take any action? If so, what is
the scope of the duty, and how would it be enforced? These questions are ripe for a
subsequent article. The idea of quasi-cooperative federalism is proffered in the bankruptcy
exemptions context for two narrow and specific purposes: (i) it is descriptive, since
Congress has offered “uniform” standards along with a mechanism for state vetoes in the
form of the opt-out; and (ii) it relates to the preemption analysis in the bankruptcy exemptions context by providing this two-step defense to preemption claims—a meaningful
review in light of the purpose of the federal standard, followed by a state law designed to
serve that purpose.
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that differ widely among states, such as cost of living, labor
market conditions, housing availability and costs, availability of
state-based welfare benefits, and the like.
The most fundamental guiding principle of reform is that
exemptions in bankruptcy should be designed to allow a debtor
to retain the categories and amounts of property necessary to
pursue future income. This principle derives from research
showing that obtaining post-bankruptcy income is the key to
debtor rehabilitation.
1. Justification
While bankruptcy scholars have long agreed that postbankruptcy income is the key variable to debtor rehabilitation,
this theory was recently tested in a study conducted by Professor
Katherine Porter and Dr. Deborah Thorne.222 Using original,
longitudinal data, the researchers examined the “fresh start”
assumption against the experiences of a group of Chapter 7
debtors one year after bankruptcy. For purposes of the study, the
“fresh start” predicate was established by each debtor receiving a
discharge.223 The researchers discovered that one in three debtors
was in the same or worse financial condition one year after
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.224
For the families with continuing or exacerbated financial stress
one year after receiving a discharge, the study concluded that the
inability to sustain regular income was the primary cause of this
continued distress.225 The data established that triggers of income
disruption included job problems, medical problems, and age.226
“The major factor behind these families’ continuing financial
struggles is stagnant or declining income in the period following
their bankruptcies. As [the study] demonstrate[s], any factor that

222. Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006).
223. Porter and Thorne did not examine the effect of exemptions on the study subjects.
224. Porter & Thorne, supra note 222 at 67.
225. Id. at 70.
226. Id. at 99–114.
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leads to reduced postbankruptcy income will severely handicap a family’s
prospects for a meaningful fresh start.”227
The exemptions reform ideas address, most directly, the first
of the income disruptions: job problems. The premise is that a
debtor whose essential property—such as her motor vehicle,
computer, or tools of the trade—is repossessed by the trustee will
more likely experience job problems.228 In this construct, job
problems include both losing a job and being unable to obtain
employment or advancement.
This premise is supported by data showing the types of assets
typical bankruptcy debtors own. For instance, bankruptcy debtors
are more likely than non-debtors to own a motor vehicle; those
who have filed bankruptcy are also much less likely to own a
home than non-debtors. Citing a 2004 survey that followed a
major longitudinal study from 1979, one study noted that 92.4% of
debtors who had filed bankruptcy owned motor vehicles versus
an ownership rate of 89.5% for those who had never filed.229 Nondebtors owned homes at a rate of 73.3%, versus a homeownership
rate of 59.3% for those who had filed bankruptcy.230 This data
suggests that debtors are more reliant on motor vehicles than
those who have not filed bankruptcy.
2. Structuring reforms
One assumption is that the federal exemptions were adequately designed and thoughtfully structured to serve the Fresh
227. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
228. One note about a major limitation of the role of exemptions in the fresh start:

Only debtors with protectable interests in would-be exempt property will benefit. The
reality is that many debtors filing bankruptcy do not have equity in the types of property
exemptions are designed to protect. Exemptions do not provide benefits to many debtors
occupying the strata of the structurally poor, many of whom never accumulate assets. For
this reason, the target and beneficiaries of exemptions reform should be the “working
poor,” defined imperfectly as employed or employable debtors whose incomes are above
federal poverty guidelines but below median income levels. Many debtors in this seam
have realistic opportunities to secure future employment and, thereby, future income. As
post-bankruptcy income is the sine qua non of the fresh start, exemption policy should be
designed to enable—or, at a minimum, avoid disrupting—a debtor’s post-bankruptcy
efforts to obtain or advance in employment.
229. Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study of Consumers’ Post-Discharge Finances:
Struggle, Stasis, or Fresh-Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 298 (2008).
230. Id.
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Start Function. This Article does not posit that the federal
exemptions are ideal or perfect. Instead, due regard is given to the
lengthy and deliberative process undertaken by Congress in
adopting the specific categories and dollar amounts of the federal
exemptions. The fresh start was identified as the primary purpose
of having exemptions in bankruptcy, and the resulting federal
exemptions were enacted to meet this objective. What exemption
levels in bankruptcy are optimal? Or, stated differently, what
qualities of exemptions provide utility for a financially distressed
debtor seeking post-discharge rehabilitation?
Three factors contributing to the Fresh Start Function can be
teased out of the existing federal exemptions scheme: housing
agnosticism, nominal sufficiency, and flexible allocation.
This Article’s model of state exemption reforms envisions
opt-out states undertaking deliberative reviews of existing
exemptions in light of these factors.231 Leveraging a primary
strength of federalism, state legislatures can experiment with
different formulas, amounts, and rates for bankruptcy-specific
exemptions. The factors are not formulaic, but rather principled.
Different conditions, such as cost-of-living differences among
the states, will necessarily prevent the emergence of a monolithic
set of exemptions resulting from this model. Harmonization of
these factors will be driven by economic and practical factors in
the states, including considerations related to the labor market,
transportation infrastructure, tax policy, costs of housing, and
the like.
a. Housing agnosticism. Most state general exemption schemes
discriminate against non-homeowners. This discrimination should
be eliminated, or at least significantly restricted, in bankruptcy.
By providing homestead exemptions to homeowners, with no
corresponding exemption to non-homeowners, most state general
exemptions grant elevated status to certain forms of housing—
ownership is preferred over renting. While all debtors have an
interest in having a place to live post-bankruptcy, there is no
empirical evidence that owning a home aids in a debtor’s quest to

231. Although most needed in many opt-out states, well-structured reforms could
conceivably improve fresh starts even in states that permit the use of federal exemptions.
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secure or advance future income. To be sure, there are important
societal and governmental policy interests in incentivizing homeownership. As the recent financial crisis reminded us, however,
owning a home is no panacea for building wealth or establishing
financial security. To the contrary, recent trends suggest that
many homeowners view their homes as ATMs (in the form of
home equity lines of credits and refinancings) when home values
improve and albatrosses when home values fall. The headlines
concerning foreclosures and “short sales” are manifest. While
exemption policy should not necessarily serve a paternalistic
function of telling debtors not to buy homes, exemptions, at best,
ought to be more agnostic toward debtors’ choices of living
arrangements and whether to own residential property.
The federal exemptions take a large step toward eliminating
pro-homeowner discrimination in the form of the “wild card”
exemption. To implement an exemption scheme reflecting housing agnosticism, states should follow the lead of Congress. In the
federal bankruptcy exemptions, a “wild card” feature permits
debtors232 to apply unused homestead exemption dollars to
exempt assets other than a home, such as tools of the trade, a
motor vehicle, and the like. In fact, unlike other particularized
categories of exempt property, a debtor may use the “wild card”
exemption to exempt his or her “interest in any property.”233
The effect of the wild card is to largely level the playing field
between homeowner debtors (with protectable equity) and other
debtors. Specifically, the federal exemptions include a homestead
exemption in the amount of $23,675. 234 The wild card permits a
debtor to apply up to $11,850 of unused homestead exemption235
to protect other property.236 This feature allows a debtor who

232.
233.
234.
235.

In states that have not opted out of the federal exemptions.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2016) (emphasis added).
Id. § 522(d)(1).
While the effect of the wild card exemption is to even the playing field between
homeowner and non-homeowner debtors, and thereby inject a degree of housing agnosticism, even homeowner debtors are eligible to use the “wild card.” Eligibility for the wild
card does not depend on ownership, but rather the extent to which the homestead exemption is actually used. Accordingly, a debtor with little to no equity in his home may still be
able to use the wild card.
236. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).
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chooses to rent,237 rather than own, housing to enjoy an aggregate
exemption level more in line with amounts for homeowners.
Almost all existing state exemption schemes continue to reflect
this pro-home-ownership bias. This should not be surprising, as
general state exemptions are justified, in part, by the idea that
allowing a financially distressed debtor to keep her home serves
important governmental and societal policies of maintaining the
family. Indeed, this policy is an imperative component of the
Independent Subsistence Function of state exemptions.238
There is no empirical evidence, however, that incentivizing
home ownership furthers the Fresh Start Function. Because of the
cyclical nature of home values, falling market conditions may, in
fact, contribute to financial distress239 by removing a potential
source of cash and by preventing otherwise mobile debtors from
being able to move to find better employment opportunities.
Since many bankrupt debtors do not own homes, or own
homes with little to no equity, including a wild-card feature in
opt-out states would serve three purposes. First, it would remove
the incentive to own an asset not directly related to a debtor’s
ability to pursue future income. By leveling the playing field
between homeowner and non-homeowner debtors, a wild-card
exemption would acknowledge implicitly that the total costs of
housing going forward may be more determinative in the fresh
start equation than the form of those costs (e.g., rent versus a
mortgage payment). Second, a wild-card exemption would largely
remove discrimination against non-homeowners, where that
discrimination is justified by the Independent Subsistence Function but not the Fresh Start Function.
Last, and perhaps most importantly, a wild-card feature would
free up a significant amount of exemption dollars for debtors to
allocate in the way optimal for each. One debtor may prefer a
larger allowance for keeping a motor vehicle, while another may
use those exemption dollars to protect more tools of the trade

237. Or debtors who own homes that either have little equity or are under water.
238. See supra Part I.
239. The opposite may hold true in periods of rising home prices, with increased

home values placing debtors in a superior financial position on a balance sheet basis.
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related to their craft or industry. This flexibility would place
debtors in a position to decide what property is most crucial.
In addition to enacting a wild-card provision to address
housing agnosticism, state reforms should address the questions
of what amounts of exemption dollars should be designated
and how they should be designated among different classifications of protected property. These questions introduce, respectively, the interrelated factors of nominal sufficiency and
allocative flexibility.
b. Nominal sufficiency. The concept of nominal sufficiency rests
on the notion that providing sufficient dollar amounts of
exemptions is necessary to serve the Fresh Start Function. At
extremes, an exemption scheme that provides one dollar of
protection would put a distressed debtor with protectable assets
in a less favorable position to rehabilitate than the same debtor
would enjoy under a scheme that provided unlimited dollar
amounts for exemptions. For a debtor with a modest paid-for car,
for instance, having a sufficient dollar amount of exemptions
could be the difference between keeping her car after bankruptcy
or having the car repossessed and liquidated by the trustee in
bankruptcy. A debtor under the former scenario would be in a
superior position.
The overall aim of the nominal sufficiency factor is to ensure
protection, at a very minimum, for a typical debtor with protectable assets240 to retain possession of as many of those assets as
possible. On the margin, providing more generous dollar amounts
of exemptions might also incentivize debtors to accumulate
property. By allowing a debtor to retain a higher aggregate value
of property following bankruptcy, the sufficiency factor will aid in
serving the Fresh Start Function.
Congress has provided some meaningful guideposts to dollar
amounts in the federal exemptions. An important threshold issue
is that some types of property should, for policy reasons, be
protected in unlimited dollar amounts. The federal exemptions
240. Essentially, assets purchased with cash or on unsecured credit and not otherwise
encumbered by a perfected security interest. As part of the 2005 Amendments, the Code
expanded rules to prevent a debtor from purchasing so-called “luxury items” on unsecured
credit on the eve of filing bankruptcy.
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include several “no dollar limit” categories, including unmatured
life insurance contracts, professionally prescribed health aids,
social security, unemployment, and veteran’s benefits, among
others.241 While some of these items are currently protected under
federal non-bankruptcy laws, as well as laws in some states, any
meaningful exemption reforms by states should include a review
of these categories and items to make sure that they enjoy
unlimited dollar amount protections.
Outside the list of property that enjoys elevated status via
unlimited exemptions, the dollar amounts for exemptions in
bankruptcy should provide a guaranteed minimum of protection.
For consumer property, the federal dollar amounts provide useful
benchmarks expressed in nominal dollar amounts. Under the
federal exemptions, each debtor is provided an exemption of
$12,250 for basic consumer property, including household goods,
household furnishings, and wearing apparel. Additional amounts
are provided for specific property categories, including jewelry
($1,550) and motor vehicles ($3,675). “Tools of the trade” enjoy a
separate category under the federal exemptions, and the current
amount for this type of property is $2,300.242
c. Allocative flexibility. Determining what types of property
should be protected by exemptions should be a central issue in
structuring bankruptcy-specific exemptions. A simple example is
illustrative. Assume after undertaking a meaningful review of
existing exemptions, opt-out State X determines that $40,000 is an
appropriate amount243 to satisfy nominal sufficiency. Assume
further that State X determines that an appropriate homestead
exemption is $15,000 and that a wild-card exemption would
permit any unused homestead exemption to be allocated dollar-fordollar over other property categories. This illustration raises two
interrelated issues: (i) other than homestead, what other categories
of consumer property deserve exempt status in bankruptcy and
(ii) how are dollar amounts assigned to each category.

241. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7)–(12).
242. Id.
243. As a multifactor model, this illustration assumes that State X determines that this

amount is nominally sufficient in the context of all three factors.
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A logical and useful starting point is a comparison between
federal bankruptcy exemptions and State X’s existing general
exemptions. The most straightforward method for determining
the sufficiency of property categorization is to use the federal
exemptions as a base structural template. For instance, if State X
does not provide for an exemption category for “tools of the
trade,” then it should. The federal list of property categories is
neither long nor particularly complicated.
There is ample evidence that Congress had the Fresh Start
Function in mind when debating and structuring the federal
exemptions. The individual property categories that resulted from
the legislative process can and should serve as a useful guide that
allows State X to avoid reinventing the “property categories”
wheel.244 Since the federal categories are viewed as a template,
State X would have flexibility to add or massage categories. For
instance, some rural states may want to maintain an exemption
category for agricultural implements. Other states may want to
preserve the so-called “family heirloom” category that exists in
many bankruptcy-neutral schemes.
A related and equally important issue is how to allocate
exemption dollars among property categories. As with property
categories, the question of dollar allocation among categories is
ripe for state-based customization. Take the example of an
exemption for a motor vehicle. Should all opt-out states have a
motor vehicle exemption available to debtors in bankruptcy?
Given that the federal exemptions are proffered as a template, and
those exemptions include a motor vehicle category, the answer is
“yes.” But to what extent? And at what cost to other categories? A
small yet urbanized state with a highly developed public
transportation system might allocate fewer dollars to a motor
vehicle exemption than a geographically large and rural state. For
large percentages of the population base in some states, owning a
car might be a virtual necessity for most jobs. In states where most
residents live in urban areas with reliable public transportation,
motor vehicles may serve as more of a convenience than a necessity.

244. There is risk that Congress could add to or remove property categories from the
federal exemptions list. This discussion assumes that this possibility is remote.

394

02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

335

9/7/18 10:02 AM

A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions

B. Parting Thoughts on the Political Calculus of Reforms
Some in Congress envisioned states reexamining their exemption schemes as part of deliberating whether to opt out of the
federal exemptions. Though many states passed laws electing to
opt out of the federal exemptions, too few failed to advance efforts
at exemption reform. Several forces have suppressed efforts for
broad exemption reforms in the states. Reform efforts pit familiar
rivals against each other: On one hand, consumer advocacy
groups push for states to liberalize exemptions in favor of debtors;
on the other, creditor constituencies resist these efforts.
Enacting bankruptcy-specific exemptions, as opposed to
reforming generally applicable exemptions, cuts through some of
the political resistance to reform in a few important ways.
First, the scope and “cost” of bankruptcy exemptions are small
relative to liberalizing general exemptions. General exemptions
prevent unsecured creditors from seizing a debtor’s property
under state law collections suits. The number of individuals facing
state law collection suits dwarfs the number of individuals filing
bankruptcy. Thus, the group of beneficiaries of modernized
bankruptcy exemptions is relatively small.
Nationally, the number of debtors potentially affected by
general exemption reforms is unsettlingly high. Data on the
numbers of Americans facing collection suits provide the picture.
For instance, approximately “[o]ne in 10 working Americans
between the ages of 35 and 44 are getting their wages garnished.”245 Almost all of these garnishments are filed by
unsecured creditors, the group that would bear the “costs” of
liberalizing general state exemptions. The enormous political
resistance to general exemption reform is both understandable
and predictable.
In addition to specific data on garnishments, more general
data on collections reveals an epidemic in past-due accounts in
America. For instance, a report released in July 2014 by the Urban
Institute found that 35% of adults in America with a credit file

245. Chris Arnold & Paul Kiel, Millions of Americans’ Wages Seized over Credit Card and
Medical Debt, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/15/347957729
/when-consumer-debts-go-unpaid-paychecks-can-take-a-big-hit.
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(about 77 million Americans) have a report of debt in collections.246 On average, these adults owe approximately $5,178.247 For
a debt to be in collections, a non-mortgage bill—such as a credit
card, medical, or utility bill—must be more than 180 days past
due.248 Furthermore, approximately 5.3% of those Americans with
a credit file have a report of a past due debt (one that is not yet in
collections), which means that they are between 30 and 180 days
late on a non-mortgage payment.249
Liberalizing general exemptions could potentially impair the
leverage and position of unsecured creditors in the cases of the
40.3% of American adults who are in default!
By contrast, bankruptcy-specific exemption reforms would
affect a much smaller group of debtors—those filing bankruptcy—
in a context in which existing exemption schemes are producing
very small returns to unsecured creditors. In bankruptcy parlance,
a Chapter 7 case is a “no asset” case when no funds are available
for distribution to unsecured creditors. Once an individual files
bankruptcy, the trustee sells a debtor’s non-exempt, nonencumbered property to produce funds for distribution to unsecured creditors. With existing exemptions that apply in
bankruptcy, the “no asset” case, producing zero return to unsecured creditors, is very much the norm.250 In cases involving very
small dollar amounts of exempt property, trustees may forego
repossessing property because there is not enough value to justify
the costs of sale. In June 2014, an American Bankruptcy Institute
study reported that only approximately 8% of Chapter 7 cases
nationwide are closed as asset cases.251
Accordingly, unsecured creditors are receiving small returns
in existing Chapter 7 cases under existing exemption schemes. In
many Chapter 7 cases, the distribution is literally zero. Given

246. CAROLINE RATCLIFFE ET AL., URB. INST., DELINQUENT DEBT IN AMERICA 4 (July 30,
2014), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413191-Delinquent-Debt-in-America.pdf.
247. Id. at 7.
248. Id. at 8.
249. Id. at 2.
250. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM: PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON CHAPTER 7 ASSET CASES 1994 TO 2000 (2001).
251. Ed Flynn, Chapter 7 Asset Cases and Trustee Compensation, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
June 2014, at 48, 48.
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these facts, state efforts to provide bankrupt individuals enhanced
exemption rights should have, under the worst-case scenario for
unsecured creditors, an almost unfelt effect on the current nearzero return. While broad exemption reforms would provide
nearly one-half of debtors outside of bankruptcy increased
leverage, the much smaller number of bankruptcy filings paired
with the reality of near-zero returns should alleviate much of the
rational political resistance to state reform efforts.
Finally, the Model acknowledges the role of federalism in
bankruptcy exemption policy. States concerned with preserving
states’ rights should find reforms more palatable. Guided only by
the factors in the Model, each state can make its own
determination of the optimal dollar amounts and categories of
exemptions in bankruptcy. Rural states might bring a heavier
focus on exempting motor vehicles, for instance. The concurrent
exemption regime is preserved and enhanced through the
federalist system.
CONCLUSION
Properly tailored reforms by states can and should solve the
longstanding quandary of property exemptions created by the
bankruptcy opt-out provision. Using the proposed framework,
state reforms would survive constitutional scrutiny. The Code and
fresh start doctrine empower states to implement bankruptcyspecific exemptions that address state-specific circumstances in
light of the federal rehabilitative function of bankruptcy. Armed
with clarity and meaningful guideposts for reform, states can now
take steps to ensure that residents electing bankruptcy have access
to broader and more effective “fresh starts.”

397

02.SULLIVAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/7/18 10:02 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2018

APPENDIX A
Select State Bankruptcy-Specific Provisions

State

BSE Statute

Date(s)

Date of
Repeal
and
Citation

Notable cases

California

CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 703.140
(West 2013)

First Enacted:
July 31, 1995

—

Held unconstitutional
by In re Regevig, 389
B.R. 736 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2008).

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-54-104(1.1)

First Enacted:
May 31, 1979

June 1, 1991

Held unconstitutional
by In re Mata, 115 B.R.
288 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990). But see In re Kulp,
949 F.2d 1106, 1109 n.3
(10th Cir. 1991).

Indiana

IND. CODE
§ 34-2-28(1)(a)(5)

July 1, 1989

July 1, 1998

Held unconstitutional
by In re Cross, 255 B.R.
25 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
2000).

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-2315 (2013)

April 14, 2011

—

Held constitutional by
In re Westby, 486 B.R.
509 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
2013).

Michigan

MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5451
(West 2013)

Current:
Dec. 31, 2012
First Enacted:
Jan. 3, 2005

—

Held constitutional by
In re Schafer, 689 F.3d
601 (6th Cir. 2012).

Montana

MONT. CODE
ANN.
§ 31-2-106 (2013)

Current:
Feb. 10, 2009
First Enacted:
April 23, 1991

—

Held constitutional by
In re Shumaker, 124 B.R.
820 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1991).

West
Virginia

W. VA. CODE
§ 38-10-4 (2013)

March 8, 2003

—

Held constitutional by
Sheehan v. Peveich, 574
F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2009).
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